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THESIS

**BRITISH POLICIES REGARDING THE EUROPEAN
UNION'S EMERGING DEFENSE DIMENSION**

by

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June 2000

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**BRITISH POLICIES REGARDING THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMERGING
DEFENSE DIMENSION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis provides an analysis of the evolution and prospects of post-1945 British policies regarding multinational European security institutions, particularly the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Specifically, this thesis analyses the factors behind the Blair government's 1998 proposal to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and endow the EU with a defense dimension. This policy offers certain advantages for Britain's foreign and domestic policy agendas. Most of the other member nations of the European Union have responded favorably to the British policy shift since it has given a new impetus to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This thesis examines the Blair government's initiatives in European defense, and assesses the ramifications of the December 1998 St. Malo declaration by Britain and France. In addition, it addresses how building the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) may strengthen both NATO and the European Union and assist in making the EU's CFSP a reality.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	BACKGROUND	1
B.	METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE	5
II.	BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II.....	9
A.	BRITAIN, THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION.....	9
B.	BRITAIN AND THE REVIVAL OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION.....	17
C.	BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY FROM 1984 TO 1997	26
1.	Nuclear Forces	26
2.	Conventional Forces	28
D.	PATTERN AND EXPLANATIONS OF BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPE AND DEFENSE	32
III.	BLAIR ADAPTATIONS.....	37
A.	NEW LABOUR ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPE.....	37
1.	Foreign Policy Priorities	37
2.	Domestic Policy Effects.....	42
3.	The Results	45
B.	RAMIFICATIONS OF ST. MALO.....	46
C.	STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF NATO, BUILDING THE ESDI.....	50
D.	MAKING THE CFSP A REALITY	56
IV.	PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE EUROPEAN UNION DEFENSE MEASURES	61
A.	REACTIONS OF THE MAJOR EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES TO BRITAIN'S 1998 INITIATIVES	61
1.	France	62
2.	Italy	68
3.	Germany	71
B.	AMERICAN REACTION.....	75
C.	NATO POLICY AND THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT	82
V.	CONCLUSIONS	87
A.	STRENGTHENING NATO	87
B.	STRENGTHENING EUROPE.....	89
C.	BRITAIN'S CONTINUING ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE	94
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	97

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Britain's view of European integration has been clouded by ambivalence, fear of losing sovereignty, and the desire to maintain the status quo. These sentiments are deeply engrained in the strategic culture of Britain. Many Britons have viewed a united Europe as a "Europe united against Britain." In recent years, Britain has undergone a drastic transformation in its attitude toward European defense and integration in general. The Labor Party, under the direction of Prime Minister Tony Blair, has dedicated itself to keeping Britain engaged in Europe, and to resolving the "European question," despite choosing not to participate in the European Union's monetary union.

The policy shift by the British in 1998 enabled the dialogue about an autonomous European Union (EU) military capability to progress and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to mature. Despite non-participation in some aspects of the EU, the Blair government has managed to remain heavily engaged in EU dialogue. Britain's relations with several of its EU partner nations has matured and progressed industrially, economically, and politically. Britain has navigated a fine line in its relations with major European security institutions. Tony Blair has worked to ensure that NATO will remain the foundation of British and European defense. Concurrently he has worked to promote Britain's deeper integration in the European Union, believing that Britain would be marginalized if it remained out. How the potential of the EU defense dimension will be developed is uncertain. However, as long as Britain is a participant in shaping its future, that potential will be significant.

This thesis provides an analysis of the evolution and prospects of post-1945 British policies regarding multinational European security institutions, particularly the European Union (EU), Western European Union (WEU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This policy offers certain advantages for Britain's foreign and domestic policy agendas, particularly in a context in which Britain is not participating in the euro, the common currency adopted by most EU members. Most of the other member nations of the European Union have responded favorably to the British policy shift since it has given a new impetus to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This thesis examines the Blair government's initiatives in European defense, and assesses the ramifications of the December 1998 St. Malo Declaration by Britain and France. Specifically, this thesis analyses the factors behind the Blair government's 1998 proposal to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and endow the EU with a defense dimension. In addition, it addresses how building the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) may strengthen both NATO and the European Union and assist in making the EU's CFSP a reality.

The Blair government sees active participation in the European Union's emerging defense dimension as a way to shape the EU's future. Blair has brought Britain closer to integration with its European Union partners than any previous British government. Britain has taken the lead in forging the CFSP. Britain's attitudes and ideas are critically important to the European Union's future, the future of NATO, and continued American engagement in Europe.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis provides an analysis of the evolution and prospects of British policies regarding collective European security institutions, particularly the EU, the WEU, and NATO. The research is critical to understanding the motives of the British Labour government in recent policy shifts. Specifically, this thesis analyses the factors behind the Blair government's proposal to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and endow the EU with a defense dimension.

This policy offers certain advantages for Britain's foreign and domestic agendas. The European Union has responded favorably to the British policy shift since it has reignited the issue of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This thesis discusses the adaptations by the Blair government, including its initiatives in European defense, and assesses the ramifications of the December 1998 St. Malo Declaration by Britain and France. In addition, it addresses how building the ESDI may strengthen both NATO and the European Union and assist in making the EU's CFSP a reality.

A. BACKGROUND

Britain's view of European integration has been clouded by ambivalence, fear of losing sovereignty, and the desire to maintain the status quo. These sentiments are deeply engrained in the strategic culture of Britain. Many Britons have viewed a united Europe as a "Europe united against Britain."¹ The first step toward European integration was the 1950 Schuman Plan that led to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This

¹ David Chuter, "The United Kingdom," in *The European Union and National Defence Policy*, Eds Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 107.

plan established control over two of the basic materials of the economies of France and Germany, which surrendered control and a measure of sovereignty to a supra-national organization. France joined the ECSC out of economic necessity as well as political design. The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, found treatment as an equal partner irresistible just five years after World War II. The ECSC made a great contribution to integration in Europe. It symbolized a step toward Franco-German reconciliation, improved security for the continent by controlling two of the primary elements for manufacturing weapons, and indirectly aided in the post-war European recovery by regulating two of the most important economic sectors. Despite initial curiosity, the British government showed mistrust and ambivalence for the Schuman Plan. The fateful decision to turn down entry into the ECSC would harm British attempts to later join the European Economic Community (EEC).²

British fear of integration with Europe stemmed from the idea of sacrificing sovereignty, which for Britain resides in Parliament. Regarding defense organizations, Britain has remained a staunch supporter of NATO and, until recently, expressed ambivalence about attempts to devise integrated European defense structures.

The 1950 Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community (EDC) was the first post-World War II attempt to establish an integrated European defense organization. Britain was skeptical of attempts by continental federalists to integrate European institutions. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden exhibited British ambivalence toward the plan when he announced that Britain would not contribute forces to the

² Britain formally entered the European Common Market in 1973. Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (New York: The Overlook Press, 1998), p. 244.

European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC was proposed as a mechanism to ensure that all West German military forces would be integrated in a European Army. The EDC proposal's fate was sealed in the French National Assembly in 1954 by withdrawing the topic from the agenda. Britain favored the U.S. idea of a limited West German rearmament and the Federal Republic of Germany's full membership in NATO. This plan was accepted in the Final Act of the London Conference, whereby the five Brussels Treaty nations, the United States, and Canada agreed to German and Italian accession to the Brussels Treaty along with a prospective German membership in NATO.³ The French agreed to this plan with the stipulation of a continued US and British military presence in Germany.

From the ashes of the EDC debate rose a British plan for the Western European Union (WEU). Established in 1954 on the basis of the amended 1948 Brussels Treaty, one of the WEU's purposes was to assure West Germany's neighbors that the country's armed forces would observe agreed upon limits.⁴ The military functions of the WEU were transferred to NATO. The WEU served as a political institution for its first twenty years while becoming more or less obsolete. All functions of the WEU except arms control were absorbed by other European institutions such as the EEC or NATO between 1973 and 1984. The WEU was more or less dormant until the 1980s when efforts were made to raise its political significance.⁵ The revival of the WEU marked a resurgence in

³ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 326-327.

⁴ David Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), p. 77.

⁵ *Rome Declaration*, 27 October 1984, Available[Online]: <http://www.weu.int>.

interest in a stronger European role within NATO and the identification of an independent European security policy. This idea would be labeled the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) in the 1990's.

The fear of less US involvement in Europe after the Cold War made pursuit of the ESDI even more imperative in the eyes of some European politicians and analysts. However, NATO Europe has continued to rely on the political leadership and military capabilities of the United States, as shown during the 1992-1995 Bosnian conflict and the 1998-1999 crisis in Kosovo. The Allies have repeatedly declared that the establishment of the ESDI in NATO will serve to strengthen both the Alliance and the European Union.

In December 1991, the Maastricht Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on European Union, provided the basis for the European Union (EU).⁶ One of the goals established by Maastricht was the pursuit of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Military forces constitute a critical element of any foreign policy. Without a sustainable and credible defense mechanism, Europe would be limited to pursuing security through economic and political means alone. The St. Malo declaration of 4 December 1998 by Britain and France has committed the two nations to vigorously pursuing the EU's CFSP. In spite of this rhetoric, the two nations remain at odds as to how to construct a credible defense mechanism. France has concentrated on forming the institutional attributes of the new European Union defense arrangement. Britain remains adamant that the ESDI must be pursued in terms of capabilities rather than creating organizational structures that would be nothing more than "paper tigers."

⁶ Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (New York: The Overlook Press, 1998), p. 388.

In recent years, Britain has undergone a drastic transformation in regard to its attitude toward European defense and integration in general. The Labor Party, under the direction of Prime Minister Tony Blair, has dedicated itself to keeping Britain engaged in Europe, and to resolving the "European question," despite choosing not to participate in the Monetary Union. In May 1999 Blair stated:

We have sometimes found it hard to come to terms with the Europe the last 50 years has created. Maybe history would have been different had we been there at the very beginning, if we had felt we were creating it rather than joining it...

I have a bold aim: that over the next few years Britain resolves once and for all its ambivalence towards Europe. I want to end the uncertainty, the lack of confidence, the Europhobia. I want Britain to be at home with Europe because Britain is once again a leading player in Europe. And I want Europe to make itself open to reform and change too. For if I am pro-European, I am also pro-reform in Europe.⁷

The Blair government has brought Britain closer to integration with its European Union partners than any previous government. Britain has taken the lead in forging the CFSP, and its attitudes and ideas are critically important to the European Union's future, the future of NATO, and continued American engagement in Europe.

B. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

The methodology employed in this thesis relies mainly on a qualitative analysis of primary sources, including communiqués, transcripts of parliamentary proceedings, memoirs,¹ and treaties. It also draws upon secondary sources such as journalistic and scholarly analyses of the core issues.

Chapter II of the thesis provides an historical overview of British involvement in European security institutions. Britain's historically ambivalent relationship with the

⁷ Prime Minister, Tony Blair, at a ceremony to receive the Charlemagne prize, Aachen, Germany, 13 May 1999. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/>.

continent is exemplified by its refusal to join the ill-fated European Defense Community (EDC), its refusal to participate in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and its abstention from the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1956. The thesis examines the establishment of the WEU in 1954 and its revival in 1984. In addition, it analyses British defense policy from 1984 to 1997 to set the scene for Chapter III's examination of British defense policy since 1997.

What may hinder the creation of a credible ESDI and a coherent CFSP may be the difficulties in reaching a consensus among the major players in the EU: Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. This thesis compares the responses to the British policy initiatives by France, Germany, and Italy. Their policy responses, in conjunction with British policy, will determine the future of European Union's security architecture.

This thesis also addresses the response of the United States to the new British policy on ESDI. The Clinton administration has shown great support for the formulation of the ESDI within NATO and the eventual attainment of an autonomous defense capability. Concurrently, the United States has issued multiple warnings to the Europeans not to threaten the primacy of NATO or its ability to conduct operations outside its traditional collective defense mission. The British concept for attaining a credible ESDI and a coherent CFSP appears to be the most realistic plan that has originated from the European nations. Through close cooperation between NATO and the EU during the development of the ESDI and CFSP, the ESDI could serve to strengthen both organizations.

This thesis concludes with an analysis of the positive impact British policy has made upon European political and defense institutions. Finally, this research outlines the prospects of Britain's policies and their impact on Europe's future.

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II. BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II

A. BRITAIN, THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

Deeply ingrained in the strategic culture of the United Kingdom is an aversion toward involvement on the European continent. The most obvious physical characteristic of Great Britain is the separation between the continent and the island nation. Throughout history the English Channel has provided Britain a fair amount of protection against invasion from the continent. The most recent exception to this was the Norman Conquest of England in 1066. Britain, as an island nation, has long been a maritime power. In the post-medieval period Britain's focus was on colonial possessions as sources of raw materials and not on the continent of Europe. As a result, Britain had neither a need to maintain a large army nor a need to remain engaged on the continent. However, from time to time, Britain was drawn into conflicts in Europe. In the words of David Chuter:

Although Britain cannot help but have been a major player in Europe — and especially in the defence area — the nation has never had the military capability to dominate the continent forcibly, and, because of cultural and philosophical differences, has not offered itself, and is not sought out by others, to be a leader and example as the French conceive themselves to be.⁸

Since the end of World War II, Britain has slowly gravitated toward Europe for economic reasons, despite ambivalence and contempt displayed toward integration,

⁸ David Chuter, "The United Kingdom," in *The European Union and National defense Policy*, eds. Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 106.

primarily among conservatives. In addition, Britain has been cautious in its slow move toward integration with Europe in an effort to maintain its strong relationship with the United States. Defense, however, is one of the areas that has kept Britain engaged in Europe since 1945. Notwithstanding its best efforts to resist, Britain's deeper integration in the European Union now seems inevitable.

The Dunkirk Treaty of January 1947 was the first step toward establishing a post-war security structure in Western Europe. France and the United Kingdom entered a treaty that committed them to preventing any further German aggression. This treaty and those that followed were demonstrative of the British cognizance of the greater threat that loomed further to the east. Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech in 1946, at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, was indicative of the realization that the greatest threat to Western Europe's security was the Soviet Union.

In 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin proposed to the House of Commons that a defensive alliance be established among the Western European countries. His statements were made in the aftermath of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Western allies correctly perceived the Soviet actions as a hostile effort to establish a buffer zone consisting of the nations the USSR occupied. However, like those British politicians who followed him, Bevin lacked a clear vision of where such an alliance with continental nations would take Britain. His assumption was that Britain was and should remain a great power, despite the apparent economic weakness of the post-war period.

The West European nations welcomed Britain's proposal with great eagerness as the Soviet Union imposed its control over Central Europe. Western Europe interpreted

Britain's interest in an alliance as a desire for an association to counter the Soviet menace.⁹ In March 1948, representatives of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to discuss a greater security structure for Europe. The result of these talks was the Brussels Treaty that came into force in August 1948. It provided for economic, social and cultural collaboration and for the common defense of the signatories, including the integration of air defenses and the establishment of a joint command organization.¹⁰ In addition, the preamble read, "To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression."¹¹ The Brussels Treaty proved that key Western European nations were resolved to work together and helped to convince the United States that these nations were serious about collective defense. The ensuing dialogue between Western Europe and the North American Allies led to the formulation and signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949.

In 1950, the Alliance was searching for a mechanism for the establishment of West German armed forces and Bonn's inclusion in a European defense structure. The French were convinced that the solution to the West German rearmament issue was through a "European *multilateral* framework."¹² The French vision for this framework

⁹ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980), p. 31.

¹⁰ Modified Brussels Treaty, Available[Online]: <<http://www.weu.int>>.

¹¹ *The Brussels Treaty of 1948*. Available[Online]: <<http://www.weu.int>>, see also article VII of the treaty..

¹² Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980), p. 57.

called for the establishment of a parliament, a mechanism for economic cooperation, and a mutual defense agreement between France, Britain, and the Benelux countries.¹³

France's first proposal was the Schuman Plan, which established multilateral and (to some extent) supranational control over two of the basic materials of the economies of France and West Germany. The participating nations surrendered a measure of sovereignty to a supranational organization known as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). France joined the ECSC out of economic necessity as well as political conviction. West Germany found treatment as an equal partner just five years after World War II irresistible. Six nations joined the organization despite Britain's failure to join.

The British found the ECSC distasteful due to what they perceived as the formation of a federal system, which was in effect the case. The plan contained uncomfortable rhetoric for the British given their governmental structure and political culture. Such a federation was an entirely foreign concept and was perceived as a threat to the sovereignty of Britain, a sovereignty which resides in its Parliament. The ECSC was the embryo of the modern European Union. The fateful decision not to join the ECSC cost Britain a leadership position in Europe and a voice in forging the future of European integration.

In October 1950, French Premier René Pleven introduced a proposal for a European Army to the French National Assembly.¹⁴ The Pleven Plan called for the

¹³ Hugo Young, *The Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* (New York: The Overlook Press, 1998), p. 36.

¹⁴ Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune: 1945-1955* (New York: Harper Row, 1969), p. 220.

establishment of the European Defense Community (EDC). The EDC was intended to create one European army under a European command, with a European budget, and a European parliament for defense. The model for this structure was the ECSC.

This proposal met with great interest since the United States was involved in a war in Korea and was eager for its European allies to bear a greater portion of the burden of Europe's defense. The Americans were in favor of a united Europe, especially if it was under British leadership. Initially, West Germany was not interested in developing a military since it had maintained an anti-military culture since 1945. However, the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the Korean War helped to convince the West Germans of the importance of establishing their own armed forces. The Americans viewed Korea as a Soviet stratagem preparatory to a possible communist invasion in Europe. The strengthening of West European defenses, by inclusion of West Germany, was a crucial element. The French envisioned the integration of the West German forces in small units and insisted that no German General Staff would be formed. The West Germans found this blatant discrimination totally inconsistent with the offerings of the Schuman Plan. Although he welcomed the idea of an international force, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer expressed disappointment that West Germany would not be treated as an equal.

The Pleven Plan was unacceptable to several of the Western Allies, including West Germany, Britain and the United States. The Spofford plan was developed as a compromise in order to satisfy British and American preferences on the issue of West German rearmament. It called for a unified defense and limited West German military forces. The Americans proposed that West Germany be permitted to establish military

forces under the cognizance of a NATO Supreme Commander, and that its forces not exceed 20 percent of the total NATO force. In addition, the West German army would be subject to limits on its total force and the weapons it was allowed to produce and maintain, and Bonn would agree to the continued presence of Allied forces on its territories.

The Spofford compromise contained no language calling for an integrated European army, in contrast with that proposed under the Pleven Plan, which had the potential to be a competing organization. The Spofford plan did not rule out the establishment of the EDC, however; so the French were able to proceed with their plan for a European Army. The Spofford plan entailed tying a new West German Army to NATO, preserving a balance of power between West Germany and France, and distributing American military assistance among the Western European nations. The Spofford report was approved on 18 December 1950 by the NATO Defense Committee along with the proposal for the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander.¹⁵

Initially the British found France's Pleven Plan intriguing. However, the response by the Conservative government was as ambivalent as the Labour government's response to the ECSC. The French proceeded with dialogue on the Pleven Plan for the EDC, even though the British expressed their intent not to join. In November 1951, shortly after Churchill's Conservative government assumed power, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden announced that Britain would not supply forces to a European Army. This position did irreparable damage to the EDC and deeply hurt any hope of its success.

¹⁵ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1980), p. 99.

At the Rome Council meeting of November 1951, Anthony Eden learned that the American position had shifted from wanting British participation in the EDC to wanting British support for the EDC.¹⁶ The change in the U.S. attitude toward Britain's role enabled the EDC debate to continue while still offering the British a way out. Thus, the British decided they should continue to support the initiative for the Continent. According to Harold Macmillan's account of the British reaction to the EDC,

During the next two years [1952 to 1954], while the fate of the EDC was in the balance, Eden acted with scrupulous loyalty to his Continental colleagues. He felt that since we had been unable to join the European Defence Community in the form suggested, we had no right to make alternative proposals. If we were to do so we should be regarded as wreckers, and the ultimate failure of the Ministers of the six countries to sign or the Parliaments to ratify would be held against us. British perfidy would have brought about the failure of European unity. The only thing, he [Eden] argued, which we could honourably do was to support the EDC. When the new structure came into being we could then find how we could best work with it.¹⁷

The British support for an integrated structure on the continent was consistent with Churchill's support for a United States of Europe. His position was based on his conviction that Britain could not join such a union due to its position in the world and its responsibility to the Commonwealth. He considered Britain a European country but not of Europe. The United Europe was to be a federal system of which the United States and

¹⁶ Edward Fursdon, *The European Defence Community: A History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 128.

¹⁷ Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune: 1945-1955* (New York: Harper Row, 1969), p. 473. Eden's memoirs of the account state that he gave counsel to Churchill on the importance of British support for the EDC in a personnel communiqué. The result of this was a joint declaration on 18 December 1951 committing Britain to close association with the EDC and close training alongside EDC forces by direction of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO. Anthony Eden, *Full Circle*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 37-38.

Britain were to be the sponsors.¹⁸ Britain's opposition to a federal system was based on three key issues: the document was drafted in such detail that it was unlike the unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom, it called for submission to a supranational organization, and it implied the surrender of sovereignty. The EDC members agreed on a treaty in May 1952. However, the EDC treaty was struck dead in the French *Assemblée Nationale* in August 1954 in a procedural motion, without any direct vote or even any full-scale debate on the treaty.

The defeat of the EDC was a disappointment for the Americans, who had hoped their European allies would accept more responsibility for their defense and thereby strengthen the Alliance. Anthony Eden knew that the defeat of the EDC would cause the United States to reevaluate its European policy. Britain quickly proposed a new plan for a West European defense structure. The plan proposed an extension of the Brussels Treaty to West Germany and Italy to form what became the Western European Union. In addition, West Germany would be invited to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty as a full member.¹⁹ The British also agreed to maintain a military presence on the continent, which helped to ensure a continued American military presence in Europe. In effect, the WEU would function as a control over West German defense capabilities and NATO would function as a platform for continued American and British engagement on the continent.

¹⁸ Edward Heath, "The Growing Pains of the New Europe," in *Old World, New Horizons: the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 17.

¹⁹ Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune: 1945-1955* (New York: Harper Row, 1969), pp. 480-481. Documents on the West German accession to NATO may be found on the official NATO website <<http://www.nato.int>>, and the Truman Library at <<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/>>.

The agreement providing for the formation of the Western European Union was signed on 23 October 1954. The three main purposes stated in the Preamble of the modified Brussels treaty were:

- to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;
- to afford assistance to each other in resisting any policy of aggression;
- to promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe.²⁰

In spite of the failure of the EDC, the process gave birth to a stronger and larger institution, the Western European Union. The process strengthened the Brussels Treaty and the Washington Treaty, which were fundamental bases of West European security during the Cold War.

B. BRITAIN AND THE REVIVAL OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

The Western European Union (WEU) stood as a silent political-military institution for nearly thirty years until its revival in 1984. Interest in the WEU as a conduit for implementing solutions to European security grew in the early 1980s. From 1955 to 1973, the WEU existed mostly as a political entity monitoring West German armaments. It also served informally as a consultation platform between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Britain. Britain finally joined the EEC in 1973, ending the WEU's function as an EEC/UK intermediary. The WEU's military functions were transferred to NATO until its revival in the 1980s.

Several factors brought about the resurgence of interest in the WEU: economic imperatives, uncertainties about trends in the Federal Republic of Germany, doubts about

²⁰ The Brussels treaty was modified for the inclusion of Germany and Italy as a result of the London conference of 1954. Available[Online]: <<http://www.weu.int>>.

U.S. reliability, and the deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. The greatest imperative was the need for a strictly European forum to discuss security issues. Specifically, this forum was to provide a platform for the discussion of out of area operations by the WEU, in which there was increasing interest.

American bilateral arms limitation talks with the Soviets proved to be politically destabilizing, as the Soviets had hoped. NATO Europe failed to assert its desires to the American policy making apparatus during the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) process even though the security of Western Europe was indirectly affected by the agreements. The true failing of NATO Europe in this process was its lack of consensus; this weakened the impact of its criticisms of U.S. behavior in the SALT process.

The Soviet conventional and nuclear buildup in the late 1970's, particularly the deployment of the SS-20, created controversy within the Alliance. The first proposal for nuclear force modernization from the Carter administration to Europe was the development and deployment of the neutron bomb. However, President Carter reneged on the offer after fierce internal and congressional opposition, causing irreparable damage to his reputation and American prestige. He was politically damaged by the neutron bomb debacle and appeared weak in the eyes of some of the Europeans.

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and other European leaders, notably in Britain, asked the United States to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons on European soil to correct the imbalance created by the SS-20. Schmidt asserted that the strategic arms limitations of the United States and the Soviet Union would affect the security of Western Europe because of Soviet superiority in theater nuclear and conventional forces. The U.S. extended deterrence guarantees might prove insufficient

for Europe in a serious confrontation, Schmidt argued. The decision was made in December 1979 to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe and to replace aging Pershing missiles with Pershing II's. This decision was followed by the British-American agreement on Trident in July 1980.²¹ These moves quelled, to some extent, the Western European concerns over the Soviet nuclear and conventional force advantages in Europe.

Despite the controversy over the SALT process, the British remained the greatest supporters of American nuclear policy throughout the period. The British capitalized on their special relationship with the United States during their campaign to strengthen and modernize their nuclear forces. Britain expressed its discomfort with the SALT process to the Carter administration. As David Yost notes, "once the British government supported SALT II and accepted NATO plans for a large deployment of GLCMs in Britain, it was in a strong position to expect U.S. cooperation on Trident."²²

Ronald Reagan easily claimed victory in the 1980 U.S. Presidential election and ushered in a new era in American foreign policy. His firm policies toward the Soviet Union, and his reversal of the previous administration's approach to some defense and arms limitations issues, caught many European governments off guard. According to Richard Kugler, for many West Europeans "the new president seemed too ideological,

²¹ David S. Yost, "European Security and the SALT Process," in *85: The Washington Papers* (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1981), p. 24.

²² David S. Yost, "European Security and the SALT Process," in *85: The Washington Papers* (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications, 1981), p. 30.

too anti-Soviet, and too unresponsive to their views.”²³ The government of Margaret Thatcher saw the election of U.S. President Ronald Reagan as a positive step toward better cooperation and coordination between the United States and NATO Europe. The stationing of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II’s in Europe was seen as a serious defeat for the Soviets. However, if the United States had reneged on the NATO plan to station Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, NATO Europe and the United States might have been politically and strategically decoupled. Mrs. Thatcher stated, “I saw it as Britain’s task to put the American case in Europe since we shared their analysis but tended to put it in less ideological language. And this we did in the next few years.”²⁴ The Thatcher government viewed itself as the steward of the American presence in Europe, and took care to foster that relationship throughout the 1980s.

This optimism was not entirely shared by other European allies and was often overcome by unilateral American actions that complicated relations with Europe. In December 1981, martial law was declared in Poland in response to the growing struggle of the *Solidarity* movement. The United States, believing the Soviet Union was behind the suppression of the Polish workers, declared unilateral sanctions against the Soviets. Although these sanctions did not cancel nuclear arms limitations talks, they did cancel Aeroflot landing rights, halted negotiations on a long term grain agreement and prohibited further exportation of American-made components for the West Siberian Gas

²³ Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose, How alliance Partnership won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), p. 373.

²⁴ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (HarperCollins: New York, 1993), p. 171.

pipeline.²⁵ The latter sanctions infuriated the British, the West Germans and the Italians. Each of these nations had massive contracts with the Soviets to provide equipment for the gas pipeline. Unilateral sanctions like these caused mistrust between the United States and NATO Europe.

The West European perception of an unreliable American partner was one cause of the resurgence in interest in an independent European defense capability. Western Europe, except for Britain, was disillusioned with confrontational American policies. The perception of a potentially unreliable American commitment prompted NATO Europe to reevaluate its defense policies and sparked interest in an independent capability. Western Europe needed greater influence in NATO and a platform to voice its opinion. Lawrence Kaplan summarized European sentiments regarding the desire for a broader defense capability as follows:

As a consequence of continuing to bury their sovereignties under a federated entity, inside or outside NATO, European frustrations with their impotence remained in the 1980s more divisive than any other issue in the alliance. The allies knew what they wanted: (1) a role within NATO commensurate with their potential, (2) progressive détente with the Soviet Union, and (3) increased and improved arms control, particularly in nuclear weaponry. They looked at American claims of global responsibility as masking insensitivity toward Europe's sharing a continent with the Soviet Union.²⁶

Almost forty years after World War II, Western Europe had matured politically, economically, and socially. These factors, combined with disillusionment with the United States, brought about a greater interest in strengthening the WEU. The French and the Belgians were successful in convening a joint meeting of WEU foreign and

²⁵ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (HarperCollins: New York, 1993), p. 253.

²⁶ Lawrence Kaplan, *NATO and the United States* (New York, Twayne Publishers, 1994), pp. 151-152.

defense ministers in 1984. The ministers met in Rome in October of that year to give the WEU a greater political voice in European politics and to work on the definition of a European security identity and gradual harmonization of the defense policies of the member nations. The Rome Declaration opened a new chapter in the life of the WEU.

Paragraph 8 of this document outlined the new goals:

8. The ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonize their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

- defence questions;
- arms control and disarmament;
- the effects of developments in East-West relations on the security of Europe;
- Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance, bearing in mind the importance of transatlantic relations;
- the development of European cooperation in the field of armaments in respect of which WEU can provide a political impetus.

They may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world.²⁷

The WEU was given greater political impetus in 1984. Despite the rhetoric of the Rome declaration, the WEU accomplished little regarding European security during the 1980s. The year 1989 marked a turning point in European defense. The period from 1989 to 1991 was politically charged and made a profound impact on the European security order. The fall of the Berlin Wall, communism's demise throughout the former Warsaw Pact countries, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union made a profound impact on the rationale behind NATO's existence. NATO's mission seemed to have suddenly been overcome by events. Scholars and political officials argued over the continuation of NATO in light of the perception that its purpose of collective defense had all but

²⁷ The Rome Declaration, 27 October 1984, Available[Online]: <<http://www.weu.int>>.

disappeared. This fact encouraged both NATO and the EEC to define a revised vision for the future order of Europe. In 1990, these visions were outlined in the North Atlantic Council's Turnberry Communiqué and the London Declaration, and they were manifest in NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept.²⁸ The European response to the changing European political and economic environment was manifest in the Maastricht Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on European Union.

The language of the Maastricht Treaty reinvigorated the WEU, which still remained an independent means for the unification of Europe. The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that met at Maastricht set out to further the goal of European Union. Britain's ambivalence toward the conference was evident even before the conference, in that it did not submit its desires for the conference until December 1990, after Margaret Thatcher had left office.²⁹ However, Britain adhered to the most ambitious treaty to date in the unification process. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was given life at Maastricht. Its final form was affected by the British desire not to include qualified majority voting (QMV) in CFSP matters, to maintain U.S. involvement in Europe, and to create a CFSP structure that would complement and not compete with NATO.³⁰

²⁸ Turnberry Communiqué, 8 June 1990, and London Declaration, 6 July 1990, Available[Online]: <<http://www.nato.int>>.

²⁹ Anne Deighton, "On the Cusp: Britain, Maastricht and European Security," in *European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No 97/59* (October 1997), p. 4. Available[Online]: <<http://www.iue.it/>>.

³⁰ Quality Majority Voting (QMV) refers to a voting process utilized by the European Union. Unanimous voting is the default method for EU issues unless QMV is extended to that issue. QMV allots votes to nations based on their relative size. Until recently, Britain has rejected the furtherance of QMV voting in the EU. However, for issues that require QMV, Britain will attempt to spearhead coalitions of nations in order to pass or reject legislation. Ibid.

In spite of Maastricht, the WEU has been hamstrung by lack of resolve and capability. Since 1991, NATO has proved its skeptics wrong on several occasions by its successes in European security, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo. The WEU did lead several operations, including minesweeping in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s and the joint NATO/WEU naval arms embargo of the former Yugoslavia, Operation Sharp Guard. The Petersberg Declaration of 1992 authorized and defined missions other than collective defense to be conducted by the WEU. With its Balkans plate full, the United States chose not to intervene in Albania in April 1997. This move prevented NATO intervention and in effect deferred action to the WEU. However, Britain and Germany were unwilling to participate, which left any intervention to an ad hoc coalition of the willing. The inaction of the WEU regarding events in Albania was indicative of the lack of resolve shown by several leading European nations toward a meaningful European security challenge. According to David Yost,

The fact that no consensus among the WEU countries could be found—that Britain and Germany in particular were unwilling to participate in the intervention in Albania—illustrates the obstacles to pursuing the ESDI in concrete operations.³¹

Although the WEU was revived in the 1980s, it was never empowered with the structures necessary to make an impact. The end of the Cold War, the EU's adoption of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, a European desire for a greater defense identity, and the American interest in more balanced burden sharing have come together in a timely manner. These factors help to explain the definition of agreements between NATO and the WEU for the latter to "borrow" NATO assets in order to conduct WEU missions.

³¹ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 1998), p. 217.

NATO's Brussels Declaration of 11 January 1994 supported strengthening the European Pillar of NATO through the WEU. It outlined the concept of separable but not separate capabilities, the need for better coordination and planning, and the furtherance of the emerging European security and defense identity (ESDI) that would enhance the ability of the Allies to work together toward common defense and other tasks.³²

The concepts of the Brussels Declaration were taken a step further by NATO at the Berlin ministerial in June 1996. The final communiqué of 3 June 1996 confirmed pursuit of the Combined Joint Task Force concept and the goal of coordinated WEU planning with NATO. Secondly, it maintained the importance of the Transatlantic Alliance. According to the communiqué,

The third objective is the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance. Taking full advantage of the approved CJTF concept, this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.³³

These documents coincided with British defense policy and kept the ESDI within the confines of NATO. Conversely, the French have purposely used the ESDI concept in less formal terms to emphasize that the ESDI could exist outside NATO. The British learned early on that a fundamental premise for a credible ESDI is military capability — the sort of capability that, for the moment, exists only in NATO. Therefore, the French

³² The Brussels Declaration of the North Atlantic Council, 11 January 1994, Available[Online]: <<http://www.nato.int>>.

³³ Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 3 June 1996, paragraph 7. Available[Online]: <<http://www.nato.int>>.

approach may be regarded as rhetorical until Europe develops a sustainable military force.

C. BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY FROM 1984 TO 1997

Despite the tension that existed within NATO in the early 1980s, the United Kingdom remained fully committed to the Atlantic Alliance. British defense policy from 1949 to 1983 relied heavily on support from the United States and conformed to NATO strategy. Britain experienced challenging financial conditions in the first two years of the Thatcher government and was poised to make serious cutbacks in defense spending as well as to de-nationalize the defense-industrial base. The government called for a Strategic Defence Review. The Defence Review of 1981 was perhaps the most controversial defense assessment in British history. The review concluded that Britain's flat economy could no longer support the military at its current level. This fact prompted a massive restructuring of British defense which mainly affected the surface fleet of the Royal Navy, a fact that would prove costly for the British during their preparations for the Falklands War.

1. Nuclear Forces

Prior to the 1981 Defence Review, the British had committed themselves to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. Britain has maintained a nuclear posture since it first tested nuclear weapons in 1952. The existing Polaris ballistic missile submarines had entered service in 1968, with a life expectancy of twenty-five years, and were expected to be out of service by the early 1990s.³⁴ Given the long lead-time for replacing

³⁴ Nicholas K.J. Witney, "British Nuclear policy after the Cold War," in *Survival*, vol. 36, no.4, Winter 1994-95, P. 97.

such systems, the British negotiated for the acquisition of the Trident missile system in 1979. Negotiations were finalized in March 1982 for the Trident II system, which was an upgrade from the Trident I originally sought by the British. Defense planners programmed four SSBN's for the British fleet to replace the existing Polaris boats. Throughout the 1980s, the Trident program experienced great scrutiny. One of the issues was whether to reduce numbers to three or to remain at four as planned. In light of Britain's commitment to an independent nuclear deterrent, it was finally decided to continue with the procurement of four boats.

Britain's nuclear forces have remained the foundation of its deterrence policy.

According to the 1989 Statement on the Defence Estimates,

Deterrence needs a full range of military options: although strong conventional forces are an important element, history shows that they cannot by themselves prevent war. Only nuclear weapons can do that; we cannot achieve our main aim of preventing all war, conventional and nuclear, without them... NATO's strategy of flexible response requires nuclear weapons at the strategic and non-strategic levels. For the foreseeable future there will still need to be nuclear systems based on land in Europe. And all nuclear weapons must be kept up to date if they are to provide effective deterrence.³⁵

Britain remains committed to maintaining a credible and effective minimum nuclear deterrent for as long as necessary. Britain considers these weapons operationally independent, although they are assigned to NATO, in order to provide Britain with a guarantee for its security.³⁶ France, the other European nuclear weapons power in

³⁵ Ministry of Defence, *Statement on the Defence Estimates* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1989), p. 6.

³⁶ Ministry of Defence, *Statement on the Defence Estimates* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1996), p.22.

NATO, has maintained an entirely independent nuclear capability since it first tested nuclear explosives in 1960.

In 1989, Britain operated Polaris missile boats as its strategic deterrent and relied solely on WE-177 free-fall weapons as its national sub-strategic nuclear capability. Britain also maintained maritime tactical nuclear weapons; however, these were removed from service in 1992.³⁷ For operational and technical reasons, the WE-177 was predicted to reach its maximum life expectancy by the end of the 1990s.³⁸ Although Britain entertained the idea of replacing its nuclear gravity bombs, as discussed in the 1992 Defence Statement, they were finally phased out of the British arsenal in 1998.³⁹

2. Conventional Forces

The 1981 Defence Review called for major cuts in defense spending, including downsizing of the British Navy. Although Britain realized that its commitments to NATO were centrally important, it could no longer afford to maintain as large a military establishment or to pursue a full range of force improvements. Britain's ground force commitment on the continent, the so called forward defense, was determined to be critical to NATO policy and would therefore not be cut. Homeland defense was also determined to be essential and was spared the defense cuts. The Royal Air Force did not

³⁷ The elimination of these weapons was a direct response to NATO's decision to eliminate them as outlined by the 1991 Strategic Concept. *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998). p. 157.

³⁸ Ministry of Defence, *Statement on the Defence Estimates* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1989), p. 12.

³⁹ Para 154 of the 1996 Statement on the Defence Estimates implied that the WE-177 would be completely phased out in 1998, leaving only Trident as Britain's strategic deterrent. Ministry of Defence, *Statement on the Defence Estimates* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1996), p.17, para. 154. This was confirmed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. Ministry of Defence, *The Strategic Defence Review* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1998), p. 17, para. 62.

face cuts; in fact, greater expenditure was projected. The Navy was the obvious target for defense cuts. In particular, the surface fleet faced massive cuts in its numbers, including the aircraft carriers. The Falklands war would prove the miscalculation of this policy and caused several policy reversals from the 1981 review. Margaret Thatcher defended this decision in her memoirs because it seemed like the right thing to do at the time in light of Britain's NATO commitments. However, Thatcher revealed the lessons learned by Britain that would affect the shape of its defenses until 1997:

On the Morning of Monday 8 [1981] June John Nott and I met Sir Henry Leach, the First Sea Lord, who argued vigorously the importance of the surface fleet. I have the greatest respect for his judgement. He could well argue that the Falklands War proved him right. He could certainly argue today that with the end of the Cold War and events in the Gulf there is now a need for mobile forces and a strong navy. At that time I had to disagree with him because I could see no other way of meeting our NATO obligations within the financial constraints...

But after the Falklands campaign the following year some of the decisions of the Defence Review were altered. Certainly no one who lived through that campaign could be in any doubt about the importance of a country such as Britain with such far-flung interests being able to project its military power swiftly and effectively across the globe.⁴⁰

For over forty years the focus of Allied defense policy was the national corps area assignments of the Allies in defense of West Germany. After German reunification and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European defense structures experienced a radical reformation. NATO published the 1991 Strategic Concept that did away with the old structure and established a reduced structure of national and multinational formations. Following lessons learned from its experiences in the Gulf War, and the new vision gained from the 1991 Strategic Concept, the 1992 Statement on the Defence Estimates

⁴⁰ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (HarperCollins: New York, 1993), p. 251.

outlined British defense policies for a post-Cold War Europe. These policies remained relatively consistent for the remainder of the 1990s.

British Defence Minister Malcolm Rifkind established three clear tasks that the British armed forces would be called upon to perform:

- To ensure the protection and security of the United Kingdom and our dependent territories, even where there is no major external threat.
- To insure against any major external threat to the United Kingdom and our allies.
- To contribute to promoting the United Kingdom's wider security interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability.⁴¹

The tenets of British defense policy, as outlined in the 1992 Defence Estimate, confirmed Britain's commitments to NATO and openly recognized the components of Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty.⁴² The 1992 Petersberg declaration of the WEU defined the types of operations that would be performed in support of Maastricht. The Petersberg Declaration states,

Apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.⁴³

⁴¹ Ministry of Defense, *Statement on the Defence Estimates* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1992), p. 6.

⁴² Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty, formally the Treaty on European Union, establishes provisions for the development of a Common Foreign and Security policy. Available[Online]: <<http://www.europa.int>>.

⁴³ The Western European Union, *Petersberg Declaration*, Available[Online]: <<http://www.weu.int>>.

Until the 1999 Washington Summit, these missions were not officially covered in NATO's strategic concept, and they were referred to as non-Article 5 missions.⁴⁴

In light of the changing security climate in Europe, Britain has firmly stated its continued reliance on NATO for the defense of Western Europe. This fact has often overshadowed the opportunity for Western Europe to establish a credible defense under the auspices of the WEU. In the 1992 Statement on the Defence Estimates, the government of John Major viewed the developments at Maastricht as a sound foundation for a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Maastricht also distinguished the difference between security and defense in regard to the European Union, "the latter being the responsibility of the WEU, not the Union [European Union]."⁴⁵ Britain was firm on maintaining a clear separation of responsibilities among NATO, the WEU, and the EU. Britain made clear its intent to develop an ESDI that was compatible with NATO and avoided creating rival defense structures in Europe. Britain took the lead in fostering a cooperative relationship between NATO and the WEU following Maastricht.

In the wake of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, the world saw the face of warfare change dramatically. The NATO structure was altered from its Cold War posture to a rapidly deployable power projection force. In order to meet the new challenges of non-Article 5 missions, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) became one of the key forces for NATO. The United Kingdom restructured its forces in 1992 to meet the challenges of

⁴⁴ Article 5 of the Washington Treaty established the precedent of collective defense for NATO. All other missions performed by NATO, outside collective defense, are referred to as non-Article 5 missions. Available[Online]: <<http://www.nato.int>>.

⁴⁵ Ministry of Defense, *Statement on the Defence Estimates* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1992), p. 14.

the new security situation in Europe. The British contribution to the ARRC consists of a full national armored division plus an air-mobile brigade within one of the Corps' two multinational divisions based in Germany. In the United Kingdom, a second mechanized division that includes a parachute brigade is also committed to the ARRC. The U.K.-Netherlands amphibious brigade is capable of operating with the latter of these forces.⁴⁶

D. PATTERN AND EXPLANATIONS OF BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPE AND DEFENSE

The prevailing pattern of Britain's defense decision-making has been overwhelmingly distrustful and skeptical of its European neighbors. Britain rejected the Schuman and Pleven plans in the early 1950s due to the implications of such plans for British sovereignty. The British approved NATO and the WEU defense structures since they did not infringe on the sovereignty of the Parliament. The WEU was devised as a security structure. However, it respected the national rights of its members. The North Atlantic Treaty had a similar quality in that it upheld national rights. Moreover, Britain enjoyed the special relationship with the United States. British foreign and defense policy after World War II was formulated around the requirement to maintain positive relations with the United States.⁴⁷

The SALT process (1969-1979) often strained relations between the United States and NATO Europe. However, this process did not shake the overall British confidence in

⁴⁶ David Greenwood, "The United Kingdom," in *The Defense Policies of Nations: a Comparative Study*, eds. D.J. Murray and P.R. Viotti, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 285.

⁴⁷ The Truman Library has recently made available a collection of documents and telegrams available on the Internet. Evidence of the special relationship between the United States and Britain is evident in the correspondence of Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Harry Truman. Available[Online]: <<http://www.trumanlibrary.org>>.

the United States as a strategic partner, as it did that of some other Allies. The end of the Cold War required NATO to readdress its functions and structure in order to remain an effective source of European security. The shape of war has changed dramatically and NATO has responded.

Despite having acknowledged the importance of coalition warfare in 1991, Britain remained adamantly opposed to full integration of its defenses into the multinational organizations of the WEU and EU. According to the 1995 Statement on the Defence Estimates,

In pursuing greater security and stability, we can draw from the deep reservoir of cooperation in the institutions we have helped to build over the past 50 years — the United Nations; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; NATO; the European Union; and the Western European Union. We will, however, balance trends towards integration and institutional action with the retention of our capacity for national action to meet our inescapable national obligations...

One of the challenges in the years ahead will be to respond to the desire to preserve cultural and national identities without generating fragmentation and instability. In this, the modern nation state will remain the fundamental basis for establishing and maintaining democratic structures and the rule of law in a way that will be consistent with their sense of identity.⁴⁸

Until 1998, Britain had rejected folding the WEU structures into the European Union. Britain's desire was to maintain the status quo regarding the European defense structure. The language of the Maastricht Treaty was considerate of the special relationship and obligations of its members toward NATO.⁴⁹ However, by 1995 there

⁴⁸ Ministry of Defense, *Statement on the Defence Estimates* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1995), p. 12, Paras. 209 and 211.

⁴⁹ Article J.7 of the Maastricht Treaty outlines the considerations of EU member obligations to the Atlantic Alliance, <<http://www.weu.int>>.

were voices calling for further integration of the WEU into the EU. Britain's greatest fear, as was commonly expressed since the inception of the ECSC in 1950, was the deepening of the EU structure. Continental rhetoric, particularly from the French, regarding military integration remained anathema to the British.

The overwhelming imperative for the British regarding European defense is the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance. Britain has fostered the strengthening of the WEU strictly within the context of NATO. There are several reasons for this. First, there are political imperatives at stake in the development of an independent defense structure in Europe. The continued influence of the United States, which has remained the great stabilizer in Europe for over fifty years, is critical for Europe to reach consensus on decisions regarding military action. The events in Bosnia and Kosovo are the two main examples. The continued engagement of the United States is crucial in light of the growing political, economic, and domestic instability in Russia.

From an economic standpoint, developing an independent defense in Europe will be expensive. This is perhaps the greatest barrier to building a credible independent European defense. European military deficiencies in strategic lift, satellite communications and intelligence, and precision combat airpower were highlighted in the Gulf War, Bosnia, and Kosovo crises. These deficiencies will not be overcome in the near future. Thus the WEU/EU must continually rely on NATO for defense capability. The British have been attuned to this fact for the past decade. However, this has been a hard pill to swallow for France, which has traditionally found American dominance in Europe distasteful and has been the greatest advocate of the independent European defense. France has tended to advocate great structural changes with no clear vision of

the capabilities that would support it. Conversely, Britain has adopted a more pragmatic stance and has pushed for greater capability to complement the defense structure.

British policy toward integration in multi-national structures has been ambivalent. This ambivalence has been coupled with the fear of submission to a federal structure and the loss of sovereignty. Even though Britain has avoided these structures, it has joined them out of a sense of inevitability rather than will. Failure to join the ECSC in 1950 cost Britain the opportunity to shape the future of the Union. However, since the Blair government came to power in 1997, Britain's attitude toward the continent has changed dramatically. The Blair government sees active participation in the emerging defense dimension as a way to shape it to its desires.

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III. BLAIR ADAPTATIONS

A. NEW LABOUR ATTITUDES TOWARD EUROPE

Beginning in 1998 the British drastically altered their position on European integration. Previous British governments were burdened with ambivalence toward the Continent and shunned the idea of integrating institutions at the cost of losing sovereignty. Despite this tradition, Tony Blair and his government took over with a new platform that would bring Britain closer to Europe. A recent Labour policy document clearly states the intention to turn away from Britain's isolationist past.

We have ended the Tory legacy of isolation, suspicion and anti-Europeanism. Britain is now playing a leading role in shaping Europe's future on the issues that matter to ordinary people.⁵⁰

Since 1998, the Labour party has certainly taken a more pro-European position. However, throughout the last fifty years the Labour party showed varying degrees of ambivalence toward European integration, especially when the Conservatives had control of the government.

1. Foreign Policy Priorities

Immediately after the 1997 election, the Labour government's policy toward the continent remained consistent with that of its predecessors. Its position on European security structures remained Atlanticist and rejected the idea of an autonomous European capability. This was evident in the remarks of Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and Defense Secretary George Robertson.

⁵⁰ Labour Party, *National Party Forum Report 1999*, Available[Online]: <http://www.labour.org.uk>, p. 9.

But we do not see the European Union becoming a defence organization. Such a development would undermine the North Atlantic Alliance and would also create great complications for the different memberships of NATO and the European Union. We therefore will be working for better cooperation between the European Union and the Western European Union, but not for merger between them.⁵¹

The successful Labour platform of 1997 promised to bring Britain closer to Europe but lacked specific indications of how this would be carried out. The specific elements of the Labour plan were not developed until after the Blair government was in place. Defense policy under Blair remained similar to that of the previous Conservative government until the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) in 1998. Labour had many preconceived intentions for defense. Among them was the need for rapidly deployable forces capable of meeting emerging security threats, like those in the Balkans. Moreover, the Labour government saw the need to streamline Britain's military and to improve its ability to conduct joint operations involving all branches of the armed forces. Blair and his colleagues also intended to cut Britain's nuclear forces, a Labour Party goal for many years.

The SDR included budget cuts that were made to reflect the changing European security environment. Specifically, the number of destroyers and frigates was reduced from 35 to 32 and attack submarines were reduced from 12 to 10.⁵² The SDR also included cuts in the reserve force and the Territorial Army. However, active forces were increased. The great emphasis placed on rapidly deployable forces has been pursued in

⁵¹ Extracts from a prepared joint statement by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and Defense Minister George Robertson from the WEU Ministerial Meeting, Paris 13 May 1997. <<http://www.fco.co.uk>>.

⁵² Ministry of Defense, *Strategic Defence Review* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1998), p. 30, para. 116.

conjunction with a reduction in Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. The number of nuclear warheads normally deployed on British Trident submarines has been reduced from 96 to 48.

The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 formally outlined the desire of the signers to form a purely European defense capability or European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). In 1991 the European Community (EC) determined that the EC should take steps to solve the crisis in the Balkans. Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Chairman of the EC Council of Ministers, Jacques Poos, declared it was "the hour of Europe." and that "if one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it's the Yugoslav problem."⁵³ That hour passed with no definitive response by any of the European institutions, including the EC and the WEU, or by their member nations. The response to the Yugoslav crisis involved a variety of ineffectual measures, such as an economic embargo and observation missions, conducted by organizations such as the WEU, NATO, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, the EC (which became the EU in 1993) failed to respond without outside assistance as Jacques Poos had insinuated would be the case. The desire for an EC/EU security intervention capability was often overshadowed by a lack of political will, fueled by a lack of capability and reliance on NATO and the United States.

The European nations' lack of will and capability to carry out operations independently from NATO was a point of frustration for Tony Blair. Since Jacques Poos's famous statement on "the hour of Europe," the member states of the WEU and the

⁵³ Jacques Poos on the ITN News, 28 June 1991, cited in Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, 48, 50, quoted in Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 193.

EU have failed on several occasions to respond to emerging crises. For example, the WEU failed in 1997 to respond to the disintegration of the Albanian government. The refusals by Germany and Britain, then led by Helmut Kohl and John Major, to support a WEU-led operation led to an ad hoc Italian-led multinational operation (Operation ALBA). Tony Blair was extremely frustrated by the European nations' lack of will to respond to crises in the EU's own "back yard" and thought that the EU should develop the capability to respond to international crises through a coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a credible military capability. His frustration over this issue was apparent at an October 1998 press conference after the informal EU Council meeting at Pörtschach, Austria:

A common foreign and security policy in Europe is necessary, it is overdue, it is needed and it is high time we got on with trying to engage in formulating it and I think that the people were pleased that Britain came to this with an open mind and was willing to participate in the debate and I think it is important that we do that.⁵⁴

Blair's frustration was justified, considering the slow evolution of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the CFSP. Prior to Pörtschach, the ESDI was based on three premises: that the ESDI be developed within the context of NATO, that the WEU was the appropriate organization to carry out Western European military operations, and that the European Union was not expected to play a part in European defense.⁵⁵ On paper, these principles were sound. In reality, the member states of the WEU and the EU never effectively acted upon any of them. The statement by Tony Blair

⁵⁴ Tony Blair, *Speech/Press Conference*, 25 October 1998, Available[Online]: <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/public/info>, (19 February 2000).

⁵⁵ Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyarmati, "Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense," in *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1999, Vol 22, Issue 4, p. 66.

changed the course of the ESDI's development. The initiatives of the British government renewed the EU's interest in finally making the CFSP a reality and creating a true ESDI.

The British government made a significant reversal in its traditional anti-integration policy at the informal EU council meeting at Pörschach, Austria. For the first time Britain sought closer European defense cooperation. Blair maintained that he did not desire a standing European army and that the overall imperative was the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance. However, Britain's position on the wholesale merger of the WEU into the EU had been reversed. This announcement was most significant since Britain had been the greatest dissenting voice regarding the establishment of an autonomous EU defense mechanism.

At Pörschach, Tony Blair announced Britain's willingness to pursue a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This announcement marked a significant shift from the traditional British position of shunning strictly European defense institutions. Blair's statement was met with great approbation by most of the other EU members. American reactions were mixed because of speculation that the special relationship that existed with Britain was threatened. Tony Blair attempted to quell American concerns with the following statement:

At the European Summit in Austria last month I set out some principles to guide the debate. NATO should of course remain the foundation of our territorial defence. Any autonomous European capability should be complementary to NATO. There is no point duplicating structures that work well already. And we should do nothing to lessen American engagement in Europe, which is something that benefits every member of the European Union. Any arrangement would also need to take account of neutral members of the European Union.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Tony Blair, "Europe's Defence Capability," in *New York Times*, 13 November 1998, Available[Online]: <http://www.britain-info.org>, (10 February 2000).

2. Domestic Policy Effects

Another clear reason for the British shift in policy was the economic and political situation of the Blair government. When the euro was launched in January 1999, it appeared that it would be a success. British public sentiment and parliamentary disdain prevented British participation in the euro. This abstention, coupled with Britain's late entry into the European Union (called the European Community in 1973 when Britain joined), caused Britain to be marginalized from many important financial and economic decisions. Britain had learned this lesson rather painfully in the past by failing to get in on the ground floor of the ECSC and the EEC, which led to disadvantageous policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The European Union has developed into a more powerful and coherent economic factor not only in Europe but also throughout the world. This has greatly magnified the significance of the EU as a political actor as well. Blair realized that Britain had to retain a voice in Europe despite opting out of the Euro. By taking advantage of Britain's economy of scale in defense, Blair chose to remain "critically engaged" in EU matters.

Public opinion polls indicate which issues are important to the voting populace in Britain. Throughout 1999 topics such as the Common Market, the EU, Europe, and the Single Currency consistently ranked in the top three most important issues facing Britain today. With the exception of the period encompassing the Kosovo conflict, defense consistently fell below the top five areas of concern among British citizens.⁵⁷ Perhaps

⁵⁷ Public opinion polls are archived at the MORI website. This citation uses the May polling as an indicator for political attitudes during the Kosovo conflict. Generalizations for the remainder of 1999 are taken from the months prior to and following May 1999. "Political Attitudes in Great Britain for May 1999," *The Times*, Available[Online]: <http://www.mori.com/polls/1999>.

this fact may be attributed to a long-standing pattern in British strategic culture: the British people have traditionally had little regard for defense and the continent except during a time of war. These polls indicate that Britons generally support remaining in the European Union and are satisfied with the Blair government's handling of EU issues. However, the single currency draws less popular support.

The Labour Government adopted a policy of "Constructive Co-operation" in 1999.⁵⁸ More recently this policy was referred to as "Critical Engagement." Critical Engagement is defined as the pursuit of political dialogue wherever it can produce benefits.⁵⁹ It is important to note that the underlying premise is benefits — benefits to Britain, thus synonymous with national interest. It is national interest that has kept Britain from full integration in the European Union. Having opted out of the EU's Social Charter and exercising an abstention from the common currency (the Euro), it is evident that the Blair government has approached Europe with Britain's national interest in mind.

The Conservative view of an autonomous European defense is not so optimistic. The Conservative opposition continues to warn the British public that the creation of a federalized European super-state meant to rival America could endanger NATO's cohesion and long-term effectiveness. Baroness Thatcher and other Conservative parliamentarians have criticized the Labour party's Britain in Europe (BIE) campaign. Speaking in New York, the former Prime Minister stated,

The fact that the present British Government, in pursuit of a doomed ambition to lead Europe, has reversed Britain's traditional hostility

⁵⁸ Labour Party, *National Party Forum Report 1999*, Available[Online]: <http://www.labour.org.uk>, p. 6.

⁵⁹ Robin Cook, *Foreign Policy and National Interest*, Speech by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham house, London, 28 January 2000, Available[Online]: <http://www.fco.gov.uk>.

towards such ideas should worry our American allies and indeed the wider English speaking world.⁶⁰

Margaret Thatcher's remarks echo the sentiments of the Republican-led American Congress that has not yet been convinced that the European Union's efforts to develop a defense dimension will not threaten NATO's primacy. United States Senate Resolution 208 expressed deep concern that the EU's defense dimension might become an institution in competition with NATO and warned the EU that it should develop a strategy that is compatible with NATO's. According to the Resolution,

the European Union's implementation of the Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective on transatlantic security issues that conflicts with that promoted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.⁶¹

Blair's engagement with the European Union in the area of defense focuses on his government's belief that the success of the CFSP is dependent upon increasing the EU's military capabilities. The lack of military capabilities has hindered Europe in responding to past crises. According to Blair, the European Union must be willing to make investments in capability. Blair has also pointed out that the investments in capability should include an overhaul of the European defense industry. This industrial overhaul includes major consolidations of defense manufacturers into multinational consortiums. It is believed that this will cut expenses by centralizing research and development funds and by reducing production costs. This cooperation should spur the development of

⁶⁰ Margaret Thatcher addressing English Speaking Union, cited in *London Times*, "Thatcher Launches Attack on Euro Army," by Philip Webster and Tom Baldwin, Available[Online] <http://www.ebird.dtic.mil/Dec1999/e19991208thatcher.htm>.

⁶¹ U.S. Senate, *Senate Resolution 208*, 28 October 1999, Available[Online]: <http://thomas.loc.gov>, (15 Mar 2000).

cutting edge technology that will enable the European defense firms to compete with American defense manufacturers. The economic potential of a more competitive defense industry is profound, a fact that Blair is well aware of.

3. The Results

Blair took advantage of the momentum he created at Pörschach and met with French President Jacques Chirac in a regular bilateral summit that included a discussion of defense matters at St. Malo, France. The joint declaration stated the willingness of the two nations to forge ahead with the creation of an autonomous European Union defense arrangement. The intention of the declaration was to give greater credibility to the EU's CFSP. The formulation of a decision making structure and investments in military capabilities were addressed.

To this end, the [European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.⁶²

The summits and ministerials of the WEU, the EU and NATO in the months following St. Malo included a meaningful dialogue on the future shape of European security and defense. The British position has emphasized the necessity of greater autonomous collective capability. The Blair government believes that the creation of a defense structure that lacks real military capabilities would be meaningless and, in the words of NATO Secretary General George Robertson, "a paper tiger."⁶³ Historically, the British have avoided entering multinational structures that have lacked clear vision of

⁶² *Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence (Saint Malo, 4 December 1998)*, Available[Online]: <http://www.france.diplomatie.fr>.

⁶³ George Robertson in BCC radio interview, 02 December 1999, cited in Kate Kelland, *Europe has Paper Tiger* "Defense – NATO Chief", Available[Online] <http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/19991202/>.

structure and purpose. British participation in the European Union's emerging defense dimension is also contingent upon this requirement. The Blair government also firmly supports the creation of appropriate decision-making structures in the European Union. The WEU was hindered in the past by a lack of consensus among its member states. Thus, the EU must develop the modalities for its members to reach a consensus for action or give dissenting members a non-hindering abstention option.

Blair's hardline rhetoric during the Kosovo campaign brought the debate on defense to the forefront of European Union affairs. In fact it overshadowed virtually all other topics of discussion, including Britain's abstention from the euro. This approach to Balkan security has been fruitful for the Blair government in advancing the cause of an autonomous European defense. Additionally, it has raised Britain's credibility among its European partners and has improved Blair's profile as an advocate for human rights. The Blair government's policies have supported his agenda for keeping Britain engaged in the EU in a leadership role.

B. RAMIFICATIONS OF ST. MALO

The St. Malo declaration re-ignited the European debate on building autonomous military capabilities. From Maastricht in December 1991 until St. Malo in December 1998, European dialogue on the defense issue had failed to produce definitive results as shown by the continued reliance on U.S.-led NATO forces to quell hostilities in the Balkans after failures by the UN, the OSCE, and the EC/EU. NATO initiatives in developing the CJTF concept and the idea of "separable but not separate" defenses have achieved positive results. Close coordination was developed between the WEU and NATO and crisis management exercises (CRISEX) were carried out to test this

cooperation. Events since St. Malo have produced more meaningful dialogue and action by the European partners. The fiftieth Anniversary summit of NATO affirmed the Alliance's support for the continued development of the ESDI. In the Washington Summit Communiqué the Allies declared:

We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and the reflections launched since then in the WEU and — following the St. Malo Declaration — in the EU, including the Vienna European Council Conclusions. This is a process which has implications for all Allies. We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard:

- a. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;
- b. As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;
- c. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;
- d. We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. We also note Canada's interest in participating in such operations under appropriate modalities.
- e. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ *Washington Summit Communiqué*, 24 April 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.nato.int>, para. 9.

These statements acknowledge the European Union's initiatives but emphasize that further steps toward autonomous defense should be taken in coordination with NATO and build on past initiatives. The Communiqué continues as follows:

On the basis of the above principles and building on the Berlin decisions, we therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance. The Council in Permanent Session will approve these arrangements, which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, and should address:

- a. Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
- b. The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
- c. Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
- d. The further adaptation of NATO's defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.⁶⁵

The European Union's defense initiatives have produced great debate on both sides of the Atlantic. There are many challenges to making an autonomous European defense a reality. These include the fact that the cost of the assets needed to create an autonomous defense is substantial and more than some nations are willing (or able) to pay. The European Union's main priority is its success as a political and economic institution. The financial convergence criteria for EU members participating in the euro (the single currency introduced in January 1999) have placed constraints on national budgets. This has indirectly contributed to the downward trend in European defense

⁶⁵ *Washington Summit Communiqué*, 24 April 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.nato.int>, para. 10.

spending over the last decade. The direct causes of the decline in defense spending in most NATO European countries (the key exceptions are Greece and Turkey) include the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989-1991.

The financial concern over the cost of the much-needed improvements in military capabilities has caused some member states of the European Union to reconsider their spending practices and the interaction patterns of their defense industries. With the exceptions of Greece and Turkey, all of the European Allies have decreased military spending since the end of the Cold War. Scholars and analysts on both sides of the Atlantic argue that the EU's defense desires do not coincide with what it is willing to spend. However, if the British are able to achieve the goals set forth in their 1998 SDR, those arguments may be put to rest. Britain forecast a three percent decrease in defense spending, which included the decommissioning of two ships and massive cuts in the Territorial Army. However, Britain is committed to the eventual procurement of two aircraft carriers and to a significant investment in rapidly deployable forces, including an increase of 3,500 active personnel.

One of Britain's significant advantages, which gives it a unique opportunity to lead in the EU defense initiative, is its all-professional force. This helps to make Britain's military an overall more effective and capable force than the militaries of some of its European Union partners. France is making significant strides toward a similar force structure by phasing out conscription. Professionalization is seen by many as a necessity for the achievement of an effective and fully compatible integrated EU defense. The NATO European nations are willing to invest in advanced technology to make their military forces interoperable with those of their American ally. The United States has

found that its professional force provides a significant advantage in the employment of high-technology equipment. The lack of all-volunteer professional forces is a significant obstacle to a stronger EU defense in light of the fact that some of the major European military forces, including those of Italy and Spain, still rely on conscription. Most significantly, Germany will have to overcome a great historical obstacle if and when it shifts to an all-volunteer force. Despite the movement toward all-volunteer professional armies, the European nations were only capable of deploying less than two percent of their collective armed forces for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. George Robertson stated in an interview with *Le Monde*,

Frankly, it borders on the scandalous that with the forces of the NATO European countries totaling around 2 million men, their deployment of 40,000 to 50,000 to Kosovo puts these countries close to the breaking point. If we cannot deploy more than a mere 2 percent of our forces, we have clearly made some wrong policy choices.⁶⁶

What is clear is that the remaining EU partners will have to adopt policies similar to those pursued by Britain and France to make the EU defense initiatives a success.

C. STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF NATO, BUILDING THE ESDI

The ESDI vision officially endorsed in NATO communiqués is to develop the ESDI strictly within the NATO framework. The French, on the other hand, are the strongest advocates of de-emphasizing NATO's influence on the ESDI and developing it within the European Union. During the development of the CJTF concept, the French proposed that CJTF be developed outside the NATO chain of command. According to David Yost,

⁶⁶ George Robertson in interview with *Le Monde*, 4 November 1999, Available[Online] <<http://fbis.fedworld.gov>, FBIS Doc no. (FTS: 19991104000486), (6 April 2000).

The French motives in advancing these CJTF proposals were interpreted in terms of long-standing French policy objectives. The concepts might offer a means to promote the European Security and Defense Identity despite the unwillingness (or inability) of France and its European allies to invest the resources necessary to build up military capabilities comparable to those the United States has historically made available to NATO. Furthermore, CJTF might represent a means to relegate the integrated structure (from which France has been absent since 1966) to the least likely contingencies (Article 5 collective defense missions) and to establish new structures and procedures centered around the North Atlantic Council and Military Committee that might maximize French influence.⁶⁷

The French initiatives seemed intended to undermine the existing structure and to diminish the ability of NATO to respond to emerging non-Article 5 missions—missions it was clearly more prepared to conduct than the Western European Union (WEU). Owing to opposition from a majority of the Allies, most of the French initiatives were not adopted in the formulation of the CJTF concept. The Alliance's Brussels Summit in January 1994 confirmed that the ESDI would strengthen the European pillar of NATO and allow the European allies to take responsibility for their own security.

We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed* (Washington: The United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 202.

⁶⁸ NATO, *Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council*, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, Available[Online]: <http://www.nato.int>, (17 Mar 2000), para. 4.

EU progress in defense matters since St. Malo has rapidly changed the shape and scope of the ESDI. Prior to the St. Malo declaration in December 1998, the ESDI was spoken of strictly in conjunction with NATO. However, St. Malo, the follow-on Franco-British summit in November 1999 in London, and subsequent EU summits have given the ESDI a new twist. According to the St. Malo declaration,

To this end, the [European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.⁶⁹

Until 1998, NATO's vision of ESDI called for close cooperation with the Western European Union (WEU). The projected WEU-NATO relationship has been overtaken by events since St. Malo that have made the merger of the WEU and the EU virtually inevitable. U.S. and NATO statements continue to call for close cooperation between the two organizations—that is, NATO and the EU. The ESDI is growing outside of NATO, but not entirely separate from it. If the European Union develops its defense dimension in the way EU rhetoric indicates, the strengthened European pillar should serve to increase NATO's collective capability and not weaken its will to act.

Reassuring the United States of this has been difficult. American policy maintains that the EU's efforts should not violate the three "D" policy of no duplication,

⁶⁹ *Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998*, Available[Online]: <http://www.fco.gov.uk>, (17 Mar 2000), para. 2.

no decoupling and no discrimination.⁷⁰ The relationship between the United States and the EU remains unclear and nearly adversarial on trade matters. Economic competition could also create problems in the NATO-EU relationship.

Following NATO's April 1999 Washington Summit, the European Council met in Brussels to set the agenda for its Cologne Summit in June 1999. The Brussels meeting reiterated the goals set forth by Britain and France at St. Malo. Specifically the European Council declaration welcomed the results of NATO's Washington summit and committed the EU to achieving a more effective capability for conflict prevention and crisis management. This declaration stated that a more capable EU would "contribute to the vitality of a renewed alliance." The most critical statement was the assurance given regarding the pursuit of "effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency between the European Union and NATO."⁷¹ The ensuing EU dialogue regarding defense has focused on making the EU's CFSP a reality. To this end, the European Council at Brussels identified three areas of concern that the EU must focus on to create an effective military capability: decision making structures, capabilities, and modalities of participation and cooperation.

The greatest advocate for pursuing the ESDI in terms of enhanced military capability is Britain. The Franco-British St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 committed the two nations to pursuing greater "capacity for autonomous operations backed up by credible military forces and the means to decide to use them and a readiness

⁷⁰ Madeleine K. Albright, "The right balance will secure NATO's future," *Financial Times*, 7 December 1998.

⁷¹ European Council, *Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence*, 3 June 1999, Available[online]: <http://www.europa.eu.int>.

to do so.”⁷² Britain’s vision for increasing capability was reasserted in a joint British-Italian declaration in July 1999. This declaration called for the establishment of convergence criteria, similar to those enacted for the single currency, for the eventual creation of a defense mechanism under the auspices of the CFSP.

3. We are therefore launching a joint proposal to set criteria for improved and strengthened European defence capabilities and effective performance to be discussed and agreed at the Luxembourg WEU Ministerial meeting and the Helsinki European Council before the end of the year.
4. This approach, to be developed with our Partners/Allies, will include a timetable to achieve:
 - European-wide goals for enhanced military capabilities to undertake crisis management, including peacemaking;
 - National capability objectives to achieve this European aim;
5. These efforts will be underpinned by:
 - Peer review: at least one joint Foreign/Defence Ministers GAC [General Affairs Council] per EU Presidency, to measure progress against the agreed criteria;
 - The detailed work of NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative;
 - A road map for more effective European defence procurement; this will include harmonisation of military requirements and collaborative arms procurement. We shall also promote defence industry restructuring.⁷³

Britain realizes that enhanced military capability is needed for the success of the ESDI and the EU’s CFSP. Without the military capability, the organization created would be nothing but a “paper tiger.”

⁷² *Franco-British Summit Joint Declaration on European Defence*, Saint Malo, Fr, 4 December 1998, Available [Online]: <<http://www.france.diplomatie.fr>>. (17 Mar 2000), Paras. 3-5.

⁷³ *Joint Declaration Launching European Defense Capabilities Initiative*, at British-Italian Summit, 19-20 July 1999, Available[Online]: <http://britain-info.org>. (25 October 1999).

The Franco-British London summit joint declaration of November 1999 suggested that the EU Helsinki Summit in December 1999 establish the political and military structures to enable the European Council to make decisions on EU-led operations, and define the basis for participation of non-EU European Allies. Most importantly, the Helsinki Summit was to develop modalities for full co-operation, consultation and transparency between the EU and NATO. The effectiveness of the emerging EU defense dimension will depend on four factors: self-assessment, coordinated spending for defense, streamlining of European defense industries, and integration of command and logistics structures.

Recent EU rhetoric indicates that the EU is willing to take on a greater share of its own defense burden. Some Americans fear that such an organization may produce needless duplication, distrust, and decoupling between Western Europe and the United States. Britain has continually assured the United States that the ESDI will be developed within the framework of NATO and that a strengthened European defense will serve to strengthen the Alliance. In a press conference on 25 November 1999 Tony Blair stated:

Let me make one thing quite clear. This is not about creating some single European army under a single command, [and] it is not in any shape or form to supplant or compete with NATO. We are all quite clear on this, which is why NATO welcomed the European defence initiative at the Washington Summit earlier this year. It is about strengthening Europe's military effectiveness and capabilities in a way which will both reinforce and complement the NATO Alliance as the cornerstone of our defence, whilst enabling Europe to act effectively in situations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. And the importance of this text is that it moves us towards a situation where we can get real practical capability to back up the ideas and the initiatives we have taken.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ *Conclusion of the Anglo-French Summit*, 25 November 1999, Available[Online]: <<http://www.fco.gov.uk>>.

D. MAKING THE CFSP A REALITY

Tony Blair is optimistic that the British initiatives will help give the CFSP some credibility. He maintains that the EU's defense dimension will serve to strengthen the alliance and not undermine it. In a March 1999 address to the Royal United Services Institute in London, on the topic of NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit, Tony Blair stated:

The initiative I launched last autumn on European defence is aimed at giving greater credibility to Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Far from weakening NATO this is an essential complement to the Transatlantic Alliance. We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own backyard. The European Union should be able to take on some security tasks on our own, and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own.⁷⁵

In June 1999, the Cologne Summit of the EU designated Javier Solana, then NATO Secretary-General, as the Secretary-General of the [European] Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Cologne Summit was also significant in that the European Council issued its first CFSP "common strategy" document, entitled, "Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia." In addition, it declared the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, a credible defense and a decision-making mechanism. The EU must, the European Council stated, establish effective mutual consultation and transparency with NATO. The Cologne Summit maintained that NATO remains the foundation for the collective defense of its member states.

⁷⁵ Tony Blair, Speech addressing the Royal United Services Institute, 8 March 1999, FBIS Doc no. (FTS: 199903090000834, [20 January 2000].

In a critically important statement, the EU Council declared that the General Affairs Council was to prepare the way for the function of the WEU to be assumed by the EU.

We are now determined to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union. To this end we task the General Affairs Council to prepare the conditions and the measures necessary to achieve these objectives, including the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks. In this regard, our aim is to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000. In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose. The different status of Member States with regard to collective defence guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence of its Member States.⁷⁶

This was seen as a necessity for the EU to be able to conduct the Petersberg Tasks. ESDI took on an entirely new face following the Cologne summit. From that point forward, the ESDI would have to be viewed in terms of both the WEU and the EU, with an emphasis on the latter, as the former institution would be phased out of existence, probably in 2001.

The joint Franco-British London summit declaration of 25 November 1999 was the most influential statement regarding European Union defense matters since Maastricht. Evaluating the events of the Kosovo conflict earlier in 1999, the French and the British determined that the European Union nations needed to increase their defensive capabilities to give the EU the capability for autonomous action. The declaration outlines the need for rapidly deployable forces of 50,000 to 60,000, able to deploy in 60 days and sustainable for up to one year.⁷⁷ Shortfalls in capability were identified, specifically the

⁷⁶ European Union, *Cologne Presidency Conclusions*, 4 June 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.europa.eu.int>, Annex III, para. 5.

⁷⁷ *Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence, Anglo-French Summit*, London, 25 November 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.fco.gov.uk>.

need for command and control assets, intelligence assets and strategic lift assets. The shortfalls identified as "headline goals" and were approved by the member nations at the EU's Helsinki Summit in December 1999. The British have also made public their willingness to join the EUROCORPS Headquarters, and have made Northwood, England, available for the headquarters.

The UK is ready, in due course and with the agreement of the Eurocorps members, to provide British forces to the Eurocorps HQ for specific operations as the Eurocorp nations have already done in the case of the British-led Ace Rapid Reaction Corps.⁷⁸

The realization of the CFSP and the ESDI remains questionable in view of the defense spending patterns of most EU states. As previously stated, most NATO nations have decreased their defense spending, with the exceptions of Greece and Turkey. In July 1998, shortly after the publication of the SDR, Defense Secretary George Robertson admitted that Britain would decrease its defense spending by three percent in real terms.⁷⁹ The British have decided to make cuts in the Territorial Army and nuclear forces as a result of the SDR. Funds drawn from the eliminated programs will be reprogrammed to support investment in other areas. The British believe this approach will enable them to realize their goal of increasing their rapidly deployable forces.

The Western European Union conducted an audit of military capabilities of the WEU member nations. The purpose of this audit was to assess the collective capabilities of the European nations in order to determine the future needs of an autonomous

⁷⁸ *Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence, Anglo-French Summit*, London, 25 November 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.fco.gov.uk>, para. 5.

⁷⁹ "Britain Will Spend Less on Defense; Rapid Deployment, Efficiency Emphasized," *Chicago Tribune*, 9 July 1998, Available[Online]: Lexis-Nexis.

European defense force. Three main areas of weakness were identified; strategic lift, satellite communications and intelligence, and precision strike capabilities.⁸⁰ These findings were not profound by any means but the report gave the WEU a clear picture of where it stands on defense and where it needs to go.

The British continue to champion investments in operational capabilities despite the cuts in defense spending. Based on the findings of the recent WEU capabilities audit, other European Union member states will have to follow the British example and find creative ways to invest in the identified shortfalls. Several plans have been proposed to attain the capabilities needed for the EU's military objectives. One proposal calls for every nation to commit a certain percentage of its budget as a function of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense. However, the defense spending of the EU nations cannot be readily generalized in terms of percentages. The defense budgets of the various EU nations are composed differently. For example, Germany does not include pensions for military retirees in its defense budget. Pensions could account for a portion of the disparity between the German defense budget and the defense budget of another nation. Therefore, the EU will have to develop a standard, or formula, for its members in order to calculate defense budgets before it mandates how much each nation should commit to defense.

Internal modalities of the EU's CFSP have yet to be agreed upon. However, the Cologne Summit established a vision for the CFSP and progress has been made in the subsequent summits. The current CFSP outlines five policy areas of which two— Russia

⁸⁰ WEU Council of Ministers, *Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations. Recommendations for Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management Operations*, Luxembourg, 23 November 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.weu.int>, (15 Mar 2000).

and Ukraine—have already become the objects of agreed “common strategy” documents. The assumption by the EU of the WEU’s institutional functions may have an important and profound impact on collective defense arrangements. Tony Blair has assured the United States that NATO remains the basis of the collective defense of its member states. EU statements regarding the CFSP confirm this and recognize the “specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states.” The EU defense structure will have to pay special consideration to the EU’s traditionally neutral member nations.

Tony Blair has noted that the European Union forces envisioned go beyond those envisioned in NATO’s 1996 Berlin agreement. The forces will have the capacity to act quickly under the authority of the European Union. However, member nations will maintain control over the employment of their forces in EU-led operations, not the European Parliament, the European Commission, nor any other EU body. This is an important factor in light of Britain’s strategic culture.

IV. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE EUROPEAN UNION DEFENSE MEASURES

A. REACTIONS OF THE MAJOR EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES TO BRITAIN'S 1998 INITIATIVES

Since 1949 the transatlantic link has been the overwhelming imperative for NATO Europe's security and the foundation of the Alliance's collective defense. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991, disorders in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere have presented non-Article 5 challenges. The United States has been reluctant to commit forces systematically to deal with all non-Article 5 security crises in the Balkan region. This was evident in 1996-1997 when the Albanian government and economy dissolved and the United States refused to act. The onus was thereby placed on European nations to act without U.S. assistance. The response was an ad hoc "coalition of the willing" due to the refusal of Germany and the United Kingdom to participate in a Western European Union (WEU)-led operation. America's reluctance to intervene in every crisis coupled with the EU's perceived lack of will and cohesion created a ripple effect in the post-Cold War security architecture. The 1998 decision by the Blair government to consider new modalities for conflict response created the appropriate environment for the EU countries to discuss establishing an autonomous European Union military posture.

The case for an autonomous European Union military posture was made in the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The horrific events in the Balkans, political and economic instability in Eastern Europe and Russia, and continued Middle East and North African tension have created what scholars describe as an "arc of instability around Europe." This arc of instability has produced massive human rights

violations, intergovernmental tensions, ethnic disputes and internally displaced people (IDPs), border disputes, and governmental collapse. These events have drawn international attention but most have not brought about action by foreign governments and international organizations. Most importantly, in view of its leadership role, the United States has proven reluctant to intervene in many of these situations. This fact has made some European governments question the reliability of the United States, notably in the context of seemingly isolationist rhetoric from a Republican-controlled Congress. This has caused some continental European nations to look inward and to support the pursuit of an autonomous European Union capability.

To develop the autonomous defense, the European Union governments must make reforms in defense force structure and industrial policy. Reaching a consensus on how to make their efforts coincide and therefore more efficient will be a difficult task. The underlying issue for the success of the ESDI is the political will of each nation and its willingness to spend the funds. What is at stake is the national interest of each country.

1. France

French President Jacques Chirac and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the regular Franco-British summit on 4 December 1998 in St. Malo to declare their intentions to pursue an autonomous European Union military capability and set the EU on a new course of defense cooperation. Furthermore, this was an opportunity to rekindle the debate on European defense and to deepen the institutions of the EU. Conservative circles in Britain have long feared the federalist implications that the EU might bring. Despite the French intentions to

federalize the EU as much as possible, the French do not foresee the complete “mutualization” of the European Union’s defenses. According to French Defense Minister Alain Richard,

if “mutualization” means an evolution toward a supranational dimension of defense policies, neither France, nor I believe, any of the fifteen will accept it.⁸¹

Since France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966, the Gaullist tradition of attempting to reduce the influence of the United States in Europe has been maintained. France saw St. Malo as an opportunity to take the idea of the ESDI out of NATO and hence away from the influence of the United States. Tony Blair was quick to reassure the United States that what Britain and France envisioned would in no way supplant the role of NATO in Europe or remove the ESDI from NATO.

Responding to the changing European security architecture and the lessons that France learned during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, France began the process of reforming its defense force structure, policy, and industry. The French lessons learned from the Gulf War were profound, particularly the discovery of NATO Europe’s high level of reliance on U.S. intelligence capabilities. This fact caused a reaction by France to create improved autonomous national intelligence capabilities. According to David Yost,

The 1956 Suez Crisis is often cited as an analogy for the impact of the Gulf War in this regard. In the Suez Crisis, many of the French say, they discovered that they could not rely on US nuclear protection and had to build their own nuclear forces. In the Gulf War, many of the French say, they discovered that they were intolerably dependent on US space intelligence and knew only what the Americans chose to tell them; therefore, it is concluded, France must have its own autonomous space

⁸¹ Alain Richard, “Richard Views European Defense Development,” in *Le Monde*, 14 July 1999, Available [Online] <<http://fbis.fedworld.gov>, FBIS Doc no. (FTS: 199907140000363), [20 January 2000].

intelligence means in order to be an independent power and to avoid the status of 'vassal' to the United States.⁸²

Another lesson learned by France was that its force mobilization plan and organization hindered it from projecting power overseas. Because French military forces were not prepared to conduct a large-scale expeditionary operation far from French territory, an ad hoc force was assembled for the French contribution to the international coalition that fought in Operation Desert Storm. These *ad hoc* troops were placed on the periphery of the formation that pushed the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Their placement on the extreme left flank was a statement of the coalition's perception of French capability. Some of the French were offended by this placement, but this experience spurred the French government to make necessary reforms to avoid placement on the periphery in future operations. In 1996, the French embarked on a program to phase out conscription in 1997-2002.⁸³ According to the French Ministry of Defense,

Full professionalization thus aims to make experienced and trained forces available, ready to act at very short notice, to fulfill extremely varied missions. Such forces will be capable of making the best possible use of the complex weapons systems available to combat personnel, and it will be possible to use such forces both for collective defense missions and for taking part in settling crises within Europe or outside Europe.⁸⁴

The French began the denationalization of their defense industry in 1993, a step seen as crucial to European defense cooperation. However, the French government has avoided full divestment of its stock in the defense industry in order to maintain a voice

⁸² David S. Yost, "France and the Gulf War of 1990-1991: Political-Military Lessons Learned," in *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 356-357.

⁸³ http://www.defense.gouv.fr/def_natio/index-a.html.

⁸⁴ http://www.defense.gouv.fr/de_natio/index-a.html.

and to prevent the massive unemployment that might be caused by industrial restructuring, acquisitions, and mergers. France maintains one of the most protectionist economic policies in Europe. It typically favors its domestic industry and discourages competition with industries outside France. The French withdrawal from the multinational Eurofighter effort exemplifies this French tendency. In addition, the French are vociferous critics of America's policy of not sharing sensitive technology with its Allies. This American policy is evident in U.S. control of satellite intelligence and the so-called "black boxing" of sensitive components in American weapon systems. The French approach in defense industry matters will become a point of contention in the European Union's pursuit of greater defense cooperation.

France has become the champion of developing the institutional framework of the European Union's defense dimension. While accepting the importance of improving the EU's military assets and capabilities, France has pushed for institutional modalities that are tied to its interests. Despite the British reassurance to the United States that the ESDI would be developed within NATO and would be complementary to it, the French have pushed for a completely independent decision making process for the new European Union defense force. Secondly, the French firmly believe that European entities such as the WEU and the EU are the appropriate vehicles for the conduct of non-Article 5 missions, also known as the "Petersberg tasks."⁸⁵ The *Livre Blanc sur la Défense* states the French opinion on the ESDI and the conduct of non-Article 5 missions:

The Atlantic Alliance must become a place in which the European identity of defence and security can also assert itself. The declaration of the

⁸⁵ For a precise official definition of the Petersberg tasks, see the quotation on page 30, referenced in note 43.

sixteen Heads of State and Prime Ministers during the NATO summit of 11 January 1994 clearly proclaims this, explicitly referring to the terms of the Treaty on European Union. The evolutions of the European identity will lend the relationship between Europeans and North Americans the long-awaited new dynamism which is indispensable for responding to the requirements of peace and security on the continent. These evolutions involve more political dialogue on behalf of the Europeans within the Alliance, as well as greater responsibilities for them in the organization. The Western European Union, which will reinforce the European pillar of the Alliance, ought to be the best instrument for this mutation.⁸⁶

Traditionally, France has opposed any measure that would subjugate it to a stronger nation or threaten its autonomy. The French Defense Minister, Alain Richard, has stated that France has "certain reserves regarding an excessive extension of the collective capabilities of the Alliance which would risk, in particular, creating new situations of dependence on the United States."⁸⁷ It is clear that France had great reservations about the Alliance performing non-Article 5 missions, but NATO has assumed a variety of such missions in response to events in the Balkans since 1992. At NATO's Washington Summit in 1999 the only issues in this regard were agreeing on verbal formulations to describe these missions and an array of collateral questions such as requirements for UN Security Council mandates, Combined Joint Task Forces, and ESDI.

The French fear that, under the "separable but not separate" and CJTF concepts, the United States could have a de facto veto over European-led operations. Considering the intent of the ESDI, which is to be developed within the context of the Alliance, NATO and thus the United States will in fact have great influence regarding the conduct

⁸⁶ *Livre Blanc sur la Défense*, (Paris: French Ministry of Defense, 1994), p. 33.

⁸⁷ "France: Defense Minister Highlights Differences With US over NATO," *PARIS AFP*, 29 January 1999, Available [Online]: <<http://fbis.fedworld.gov>. Search of France and Leader, Military, Political, International, Doc. No. FBIS-FTS19990129000556. [6 April 2000].

of European-led operations. This will continue to be the case, at least until the EU develops the capability for a sustainable force that is entirely separate from dependence on U.S. and common NATO assets. Currently, Europe has no intention to create new forces to man the 50,000 to 60,000 troop force envisioned in the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions.⁸⁸ Since the European Union nations do not intend to spend more on military forces than they currently do, it is safe to assume that these troops will come from forces already committed to NATO.

Several plans have been suggested for coordinating efforts to acquire the needed assets. One of the most attractive proposals has been the establishment of convergence criteria. French Defense Minister Alain Richard agreed with the recommendation of the British-based Center for European Reform (CER) to pursue convergence criteria for the EU defense structure similar to the monetary criteria established in the Maastricht Treaty. In Richard's words,

Harmonization of the defense policies of the European Union countries will be necessary for the coherence of our approach. I approve the idea of establishing convergence criteria toward a common defense. It can effectively encourage some European states to maintain or achieve, in time, a credible level of means of defense, and in particular, the technological capabilities suited to our needs... I would recommend also criteria relative to operational capabilities, such as: the number of companies that can be deployed in two months, the number of planes capable of precision strikes day and night, etc. This will test the determination of each country to contribute forces to the EU that will be ready to act in conflicts where our collective credibility will be at stake.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ European Union, *Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999*, Available[Online]: <http://www.europa.eu.int>, Part II, para 28, (14 Mar 2000).

⁸⁹ Alain Richard, "Richard Views European Defense Development," in *Le Monde*, 14 July 1999, FBIS Doc no. (FTS: 199907140000363, [20 January 2000]).

2. Italy

Italy met the announcements at Pörtlach and St. Malo of British intentions to pursue an autonomous European Union military capability with great interest. The Italian position on the establishment of the European Union force supports the autonomous capability but opposes creating a structure that could supplant the primacy of NATO. The political rhetoric that has emanated from Rome virtually echoes that coming from London. Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini stated that Europe should pursue these capabilities in the following ways.

Our joint work should concern three sectors: institutions, in particular in relations between WEU and the Union; the strengthening of operational capabilities; cooperation on weapons; European defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Future debate will certainly center around these topics.⁹⁰

Dini was correct to assert that the future debate on the emerging EU defense dimension would center on these topics. The issue of capabilities has proven to be the most difficult due to competing national priorities and the fiscal restraints of the requirements for monetary convergence. Italy has recognized this fact and has joined with Britain in pursuit of ways to achieve greater collective capability. Italy, along with Britain, was one of the first proponents of developing convergence criteria for the European Union nations participating in the EU military structure.

Italy and Britain signed a joint defense declaration on 20 July 1999. The purpose of this declaration was to commit the two countries to pursuing convergence criteria for the EU military capability. Some commentators in Europe have suggested establishing

⁹⁰ Lamberto Dini, *Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Hon. Lamberto Dini, to the Parliamentary Forum of the Western European Union and of the European Union*, Rome, 16 November 1998, Available[Online]: http://www.esteri.it/archives_press/speeches/, (5 Mar 2000).

current national per capita spending levels on military capabilities as a goal. Other European analysts suggest that the EU nations should establish thresholds for defense spending on research and development (R&D) for high-technology weaponry, acquisition, and operations and maintenance (O&M). Another suggestion recommends establishing thresholds for the percentage of the individual EU nation's population in uniform. Yet another concept holds that all EU nations should establish all-professional forces as Britain has done and as France is currently doing.⁹¹ The convergence criteria concept has become popular among EU member states such as France, Germany and the Benelux countries.

The industrial cooperation that has developed between Italy and Britain has contributed to a bi-polar system; one alignment links Germany and France and the other Britain and Italy. Italy seems to be a natural partner for Britain in the realm of the defense industry. Italy appears to be moving faster than other EU members (e.g., France) toward a defense-industrial model based on competition and diminished state regulation. Major mergers have already taken place between Italian and British defense firms that have created a ripple effect among the European defense industries. Nations such as France have resisted (a) opening their markets to competition and (b) full governmental divestment of their stock in defense industries, but have nonetheless pursued mergers with other European defense firms.

⁹¹ François Heisbourg, "L'Europe de la défense dans l'Alliance atlantique," in *Politique Etrangère*, Summer 1999, pp. 225-229. Heisbourg wrote on these same concepts in "Emerging European Power Projection Capabilities" from Joint RAND & GCSP Workshop "NATO's New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East" Geneva, 15-16 July 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.gcsp.ch>.

During the 1999 Kosovo crisis, the Italians found themselves in a position they had never before experienced. No longer was Italy simply a loyal ally; it was in a position to exert unprecedented influence on NATO strategy in the conduct of an operation, to an even greater degree than during the Bosnia crisis in 1995. Italy's geographic position close to Yugoslavia made it a natural station for allied air forces. Italy realized its potential for influencing the decision making process of the Alliance. A new core group in NATO, the so-called Quint, was formed, made up of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, that provided the primary decision-making apparatus for target selection in Kosovo. This process often frustrated the efforts of military leaders and strategists that believed the air campaign was less effective due to the slow NATO target selection process. However, European influence, which included Italian influence, over the NATO decision making process was asserted. No longer was Italy simply the proverbial NATO "aircraft carrier" of the Mediterranean; it was an operational and strategic player.⁹²

In July 1999, Italy and Britain proposed the establishment of convergence criteria to improve the strength and performance of the European Union's defense capabilities.⁹³ Italy's agreement to pursue convergence criteria with Britain is probably an attempt to build on the momentum created by the Kosovo crisis. Italy is certainly a proponent of the emerging defense dimension of the European Union. It is more prone to follow the pragmatic British approach than to follow a premature French approach. One Italian

⁹² Frederico Fubini, "The Italian Paradox: We are Important but we Count for Little," in *Limes*, 20 October 1999, FBIS Doc no. (FTS: 19991203001570), [20 January 2000].

⁹³ *Joint Declaration Launching European Defense Capabilities Initiative*, at British-Italian Summit, 19-20 July 1999, Available[Online]: <http://britain-info.org>. (25 October 1999).

concern is the risk of overstretching Rome's commitments in light of the Monetary Union's fiscal requirements. This concern will make Italian accession to the EU's defense dimension a slow and careful process. However, the establishment of EU standards for defense spending and restructuring could provide the Italians an incentive to reform. The economic and budgetary reforms required by the Maastricht Treaty for participation in the monetary union had significant effects on Italy, and EU convergence criteria in the military area might have a comparable impact.

3. Germany

Germany may prove to be the greatest stalwart in the process of forming the EU military capability. Historical and legal impediments have prevented Germany from pursuing a national defense strategy. Germany's current force structure is almost entirely integrated with NATO forces or with WEU forces to be used in a multinational setting, as Forces Answerable to the Western European Union (FAWEU), like the EUROCORPS. Reforms in the German military are slow due to constitutional limitations on the employment of German combat forces and due to current strict budgetary limits. Until 1994, Germany was rather unwilling to commit forces to military operations outside of its borders, though it agreed to the so-called "Petersberg tasks," including the use of combat forces for peacekeeping, if deemed necessary. The crises in the Balkans led to a July 1994 ruling by the German Federal Constitutional Court that clarified the conditions under which German forces may participate in peacekeeping operations.

Germany's reaction to St Malo was lukewarm in light of the ongoing debate on the British rebate on its financial contribution to the EU common budget.⁹⁴ At the time of the St Malo summit, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder drew attention to the disparities of the national tax bases and called for an end to the veto system that applies to tax issues in the EU. Blair reminded both Schröder and French State President Chirac of the original intent of the British rebate, which was established to offset the massive subsidies that are granted under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to other EU countries.⁹⁵ Germany supports the Franco-British plan for attaining an autonomous EU defense capability in order to create a viable EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, Germany recognizes the primacy of NATO and its significance for European defense.

The current German Red-Green coalition government has made cuts in defense spending, reducing the German defense budget to 1.5% of the nation's GDP; and it plans to cut even more. Despite the objections of the German Defense Ministry, projections of German defense spending in 2000 are 45.3 billion DM, with a decrease to 43.7 billion DM by 2003.⁹⁶ By 2003 German defense spending will be about or less than one percent of the German GDP. This trend may harm the EU's plan to create an autonomous

⁹⁴ This rebate was negotiated during the Thatcher government. It gave Britain substantial relief on its contribution to the common EU budget.

⁹⁵ Britain currently pays about £8 billion a year and gets back £5.7 billion in subsidies and grants. Britain then receives a rebate of about £2 billion, which was expected to fall to £1.4 billion in 1999. Germany and France contribute the most to the EU, Germany £15.8 billion and France £9.8 billion, and neither receives a rebate. These figures are based on the British pound in 1998. The German and French figures are stated in pounds to explain their contributions relative to Britain's. "Blair Clashes With Chirac in Cashback Row," in *The Times*, 5 December 1998, Available[Lexis-Nexis]: Search (Germany and St Malo), 5 March 2000.

⁹⁶ German Ministry of Defense (September 1999).

defense. The downward trend in German defense spending will make the acquisition of the needed assets all the more difficult.

Many of the allies perceive the German army as slow and immobile due to the continued reliance on heavy mechanized forces and the reluctance to improve in the areas of intelligence, strategic lift, interoperable command and control assets, and mobile forces. The modernization of Germany's military establishment will be necessary to enable it to play an active role in the EU's CFSP. Despite Defense Minister Scharping's public vocal objection to defense cuts and his demand for funding new equipment, the German government remains unwilling to commit funds to restructure the armed forces. This will probably hamper the EU in developing the rapid reaction forces it envisions. Former NATO Military Committee Chairman General Klaus Naumann has criticized the low level of spending on the Bundeswehr. General Naumann has commented on the trend in German defense spending as follows:

It is not possible to save 3 billion [DM] now and 18 billion [DM] in the medium term without draining massive amounts from the capital assets, primarily from the Army. Postponing and stretching things would once again mean squandering confidence in the force.

...With a defense budget of less than 1.5 percent of GDP, Germany will be in the bottom third in NATO and have no opportunity to initiate the urgently needed modernization.⁹⁷

Germany shares the vision of the EU acting as a responsible power in international security affairs and advocates integrating the WEU's functions into the EU. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder firmly believes that the EU will be an actor in international

⁹⁷ Klaus Naumann, "Naumann Criticizes Defense budget Cuts," in *Die Welt*, 28 July 1999, FBIS Doc no. (FTS: 199907280000158, [20 January 2000].

security affairs, but this is contingent upon continued cooperation in the EU and the formalization of a coherent CFSP. According to Chancellor Schröder,

The European Union will be heard within the international concert of powers and be able to fulfill its responsibilities only if it succeeds in building its forces in such a way in the future that it treads the international stage with a unified policy—in other words, when it takes the stage as a single player.⁹⁸

German rhetoric expresses support for the EU's plan for defense. However, the actions of the German government do not indicate such support. This will decrease Germany's influence in the shaping of the EU military dimension.

Germany has been reluctant to abandon its conscription system, which is designed to generate a large army for territorial defense, and pursue an all-volunteer professional army like the British and French examples. Those in favor of the conscription system argue that eliminating the conscription system would exact a drastic toll on Germany's public service jobs manned by conscripts who choose non-military forms of public service rather than military service. The fact remains that both NATO and the EU desire a more rapidly deployable force, and the development of this force would be hampered by the inability of one of its largest contributors to make necessary changes in its military establishment.

The German government's unwillingness to spend more on defense may relate to its unwillingness to spend more on European Union activities. Germany is the EU's greatest contributor. It appears that domestic economic limitations, including the lagging economy (still hampered by the integration of the former East Germany), are forcing a

⁹⁸ Gerhard Schröder, in a speech to the 37th Bundeswehr Commander's Conference, Hamburg, Germany, 29 November 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.bundesregierung.de>, (3 December 1999).

decrease in defense spending. Chancellor Schröder did offer some encouragement to ESDI supporters when he noted that the “Common Security and Future of the Bundeswehr Commission” will make recommendations regarding the Bundeswehr’s mission, size, form of service, training and equipment by May 2000.⁹⁹

Germany appears to gravitate toward France more than any other nation in the European Union. This factor is perhaps linked to the ECSC, when post-World War II Germany first gained recognition as a “normal” partner in a treaty. However, this gravitation is better understood in the context of the French desire to keep the Germans engaged in some sort of cooperative framework in order to exert some influence over Germany’s political and economic strength. The German-French alignment has contributed to the apparent east-west, north-south polarization within the EU. Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac share the vision of maintaining and promoting the social market economy, a system which tends not to promote competition and yet maintains a robust social welfare “safety net.” This factor alone may present a significant obstacle to European defense cooperation, as exemplified by the French withdrawal from the Eurofighter program in favor of its domestic program—the Rafale.

B. AMERICAN REACTION

The purpose of the EU’s defense efforts is to ensure that the EU has a more credible CFSP backed up by a capable military force. The United States perceives this as advantageous to its effort to ensure a stable European security environment and to encourage NATO Europe to share a greater part of the burden of providing for its own

⁹⁹ Gerhard Schröder, in “Speech to the 37th Bundeswehr Commander’s Conference”, Hamburg, Germany, 29 November 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.bundesregierung.de>, (3 December 1999).

security. The earliest example of American encouragement of burden sharing in Europe dates back to the EDC in 1950. The United States encouraged Western Europe to take a larger role in providing for its own security due to the perceived threat of a Soviet invasion of Europe after the breakout of the Korean War. In a period of shrinking defense budgets and overstretched military forces, the United States is again seeking a partner to share the burden of European security.

The United States continues to support the idea of the European Security and Defense Identity within the NATO framework. Since the conception of the ESDI, the United States has promoted a stronger European military capability. However, this support has been conditional on the primacy of NATO for the defense of Europe. Washington has been concerned lest a European structure duplicate NATO's. The United States welcomed the British-French declaration of St. Malo. This declaration was perceived as an effort by two of the leading countries in the European Union to convince the EU partners to take up a greater share of responsibility for their own security. In actuality, the British and French proposed that the European Union take charge of non-Article 5 security challenges in cases where NATO and the United States were unwilling to act.

Although it welcomed the St. Malo declaration, the United States warned the European Union of the ESDI's potential to decouple the transatlantic link, duplicate existing structures, and possibly discriminate against non-EU NATO members. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated the U.S. position as follows:

First, we want to avoid decoupling: NATO is the expression of the indispensable transatlantic link. It should remain an organization of

sovereign allies, where European decision-making is not unhooked from broader alliance decision making.

Second, we want to avoid duplication: defense resources are too scarce for allies to conduct force planning, operate command structures, and make procurement decisions twice — once at NATO and once more at the EU.

And third, we want to avoid any discrimination against NATO members who are not EU members.¹⁰⁰

The probability of decoupling the transatlantic link seems low, at least in the next decade. The United States is the nation most capable of backing up its diplomacy with military force. This was proven throughout the decade after the Cold War. The European Union appears to be less capable of doing so since its diplomatic weight is constrained by its lack of political cohesion and its limited collective military power. As the world's only remaining superpower, the United States possesses superior military forces. This explains the European Union's dependence on the United States for crisis response operations in the Balkans. America's superiority in weaponry also explains NATO's reliance on the United States as the primary contributor to the air campaign in Kosovo. While the European Union countries insist on creating structures, the United States has encouraged the acquisition of capabilities in order that the European Union may be a greater participant in future military operations. According to three expert commentators,

¹⁰⁰ Madeleine K. Albright, "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future," in *Financial Times*, 7 December 1998.

The European tendency to eschew the use of force as a central policy tool makes Europe unwilling, and increasingly unable, to play a strong military role in defending common interests. This means that the burden falls disproportionately on the US, even in cases where Europeans agree that force is necessary. If this division of labor continues, US and European approaches to security problems will become more difficult to reconcile.¹⁰¹

Selected Countries	Military Budget (\$b)
United States	269.8
France	39.2
United Kingdom	37.1
Germany	31.9
Italy	22.4
Turkey	7.8
Canada	7.1
Spain	7.1
Netherlands	6.5
Greece	5.4
Belgium	3.6
Poland	3.3
Norway	3.2
Denmark	2.7
Portugal	2.3
Czech Republic	1.1
Hungary	0.7
Luxembourg	0.1

Table 1. U.S. Military Budget vs. Allied Budgets (billions US\$).

The United States has expressed concern over the inability of the EU nations, which desire an autonomous defense, to back up their rhetoric with action. Action translates as spending on the assets that are already identified by the EU as necessary for the creation of a credible autonomous military dimension. Table 1 indicates the projected

¹⁰¹ Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Laine, Charles Grant, "Building a European Defence Capability," *Survival*, Spring 1999, page 21.

defense budgets of the NATO nations for the year 1998.¹⁰² According to these figures, NATO Europe spends roughly half of what the United States spends on defense. The disparities in investment between the United States and its NATO allies are profound, especially when the return on that investment is compared.

The WEU has expressed its belief that it possesses the capabilities to conduct the Petersberg tasks. However, the WEU member nations have also acknowledged the fact that they need to strengthen their military capabilities. The areas of military weakness were identified in the WEU audit of capabilities. According to the WEU Council of Ministers,

The results of this audit show that Europeans, in principle, have the available force levels and resources needed to prepare and implement military operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks, i.e. humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking...¹⁰³

The United States is concerned that European actions do not match the rhetoric. An even greater concern for the United States is that the European Union may duplicate existing structures in NATO, which would make European security decision making a more difficult task. The United States has pushed the Europeans to clarify the decision making process of the EU's military dimension. The Cologne Summit Presidency Conclusions imply that the EU decision making process will not prejudice NATO actions.

¹⁰² "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense," (March 1999), Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil>, Chap. III.

¹⁰³ WEU Council of Ministers, *Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations. Recommendations for Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management Operations*, Luxembourg, 23 November 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.weu.int>, (15 Mar 2000).

To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.¹⁰⁴

The EU statements at the Cologne Summit did not quell fears that the EU military dimension would supplant NATO. The United States Congress was more skeptical of EU intentions. On 28 October the Senate unanimously passed Senate resolution 208, which stated,

- (1) on matters of trans-Atlantic concern the European Union should make clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through its European Security and Defense Identity only after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been offered the opportunity to undertake that mission but had referred it to the European Union for action;
- (2) improved European military capabilities, not new institutions outside of the Alliance, are the key to a vibrant and more influential European Security and Defense Identity within NATO;
- (3) failure of the European allies of the United States to achieve the goals established through the Defense Capabilities Initiative would weaken support for the Alliance in the United States;
- (4) the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective partners of the United States in supporting mutual interests;

¹⁰⁴ European Union, *Cologne European Council Presidency Conclusions*, 3-4 June 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.europa.eu.int>, Annex III, Para 1.

- (5) the European Union must implement its Cologne Summit decisions concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United States, will not be discriminated against, but will be fully involved when the European Union addresses issues affecting their security interests;
- (6) the European Union's implementation of the Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective on transatlantic security issues that conflicts with that promoted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
- (7) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote unnecessary duplication of the resources and capabilities provided by NATO; and
- (8) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne Summit decisions should not promote a decline in the military resources that European allies contribute to NATO, but should instead promote the complete fulfillment of their respective force commitments to the Alliance.¹⁰⁵

In light of the fact that no clarification had been given on the relationship of the EU to NATO, and that there was no definition of the EU's decision making process, the United States Senate asked that NATO be given right of first refusal in European security matters. American pressure on the EU has produced more acceptable statements on the relationship of the EU to NATO. The EU Helsinki summit in December 1999 produced clearer wording concerning the relationship of the EU with NATO. The Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions stated that the EU would act where NATO was not engaged. These words are more consistent with the wording of the December

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Senate, *Senate Resolution 208*, 28 October 1999, Available[Online]: <http://thomas.loc.gov>, (15 March 2000).

1998 St. Malo declaration and the April 1999 Washington Summit Communiqué.¹⁰⁶ The Helsinki statement is nonetheless somewhat vague; it implies that NATO is probably the institution of choice for matters of European security.

The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.¹⁰⁷

C. NATO POLICY AND THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The St. Malo declaration in December 1998 and subsequent events influenced NATO's deliberations at the Washington Summit in April 1999. ESDI was an important issue that received attention in both the Washington Summit Communiqué and the Strategic Concept. The Washington Summit recognized the importance of developing the ESDI within NATO and encouraged the efforts of the WEU and the EU to pursue a stronger defense in order to make a more effective and coherent contribution to the Alliance. However, the wording of the communiqué acknowledged the EU's willingness to act, but only on a conditional basis.

We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ NATO, Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.nato.int>, Para 9.a, (15 March 2000).

¹⁰⁷ European Union, *Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10-11 December 1999*, Available[Online]: <http://www.europa.eu.int>, Part II, para 27.

¹⁰⁸ NATO, Washington Summit Communiqué, 24 April 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.nato.int>, Para 9.a, (15 Mar 2000).

Prior to the Washington Summit, some NATO nations—including France—expressed concern that the United States was trying to change NATO, originally established as a collective defense organization, into a global actor capable of operating out of its geographically assigned area.¹⁰⁹ The French were correct in observing that NATO was changing; and the Washington Summit confirmed a number of changes. However, these changes were inevitable in light of the evolving security environment of the Euro-Atlantic area. The new Strategic Concept of 1999 outlined adaptations that enable it to respond to non-Article 5 contingencies.

To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- **Crisis Management:** To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty,

¹⁰⁹ Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty) specifies the geographical zone of application of the mutual-defense pledge in Article 5. The treaty does not place any geographical limits on the non-Article 5 activities of the parties.

to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.

- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.¹¹⁰

The primacy of NATO to act in Article 5 scenarios is not threatened by the declarations of the EU and the WEU. The EU declarations at Helsinki and Cologne were careful to address this issue. The combination of the WEU and the EU raises questions about the future of the Article V commitments of the Brussels Treaty. According to this article of the Brussels Treaty, as revised and amended in 1954,

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.¹¹¹

This scenario also raises many questions about the possibility of “back door commitments,” or in simple terms NATO being drawn into a crisis by an act of aggression against an EU member that is not a member of NATO. In addition, there remain many unanswered questions concerning the relationship of the non-EU members of NATO to the EU.

NATO realizes that the path to an effective and coherent ESDI requires investment in improved capabilities. In April 1999, the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was endorsed at NATO’s fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington, D.C. The

¹¹⁰ NATO, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, 23-24 April 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.nato.int>, Section I, Para 10, (15 Mar 2000).

¹¹¹ Western European Union, *Modified Brussels Treaty*, 23 October 1954, Available[Online]: <http://www.weu.int>, Article 5.

DCI is intended to provide guidelines for the Allies to transform their militaries to meet the new challenges of Europe's security environment and to catch up to the technologically advanced forces of the United States. The DCI established 58 goals organized in five major areas: mobility; sustainability; precision engagement; command, control, and communications (C3); and survivability.

The objective of this initiative is to improve defence capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces, and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces...

In identifying the most important areas for improvement, and with a special focus on interoperability, the work has concentrated on the deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, on their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and on command and control and information systems.¹¹²

The DCI stems from an American proposal to establish guidelines for the NATO allies to follow in the strengthening of their defenses. The initiative emerged from the Alliance's experiences in Bosnia and from America's pursuit of innovations under the rubric of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); it includes ideas from Joint Vision 2010 and concepts of information warfare. The motivation behind the DCI was the fact that the United States and NATO Europe were modernizing and restructuring their armed forces at different rates. Adherence to the DCI is critical to the further development of the ESDI. Previous ESDI efforts in NATO were mostly constructed around institutional arrangements, while the DCI stresses the importance of capabilities. The EU nations supporting the autonomous EU defense dimension must show that they are serious about

¹¹² NATO Press Release, NAC-S(99)69, *The Defence Capabilities Initiative*, 25 April 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.nato.int>, (15 March 2000), para. 1, 5.

strengthening their military capabilities. The EU debate that has centered on creating structural arrangements is empty rhetoric without the reinforcement of credible capabilities. NATO, and in turn the EU, will be strengthened by adherence to the DCI.

The policy shift by the British in 1998 enabled the dialogue about an autonomous EU military capability to progress and the ESDI to mature. Despite non-participation in some aspects of the EU, the Blair government has managed to remain heavily engaged in EU dialogues. Britain's relations with several of its EU partner nations has matured and progressed industrially, economically, and politically. Britain has navigated a fine line in its relations with major European security institutions. On one hand, Tony Blair has worked to ensure that NATO will remain the foundation of British and West European defense. On the other, he has worked to engage Britain more deeply in the European Union, believing that Britain would be marginalized if it remained out. How the potential of the EU defense dimension will be developed is uncertain. However, as long as Britain is a participant in shaping its future, that potential will be significant.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. STRENGTHENING NATO

The British announcements in the fall of 1998 ushered in a new debate on an autonomous EU defense dimension intended to support the EU's CFSP. London was previously the most prominent dissenting voice on forming an autonomous European Union military capability. Britain's change in policy brought the prospect of such a capability closer to reality. The initiatives of the EU and NATO in the last two years have created the potential for a stronger Alliance structure. This dialogue has also produced the potential for an even more complicated European security architecture. (This architecture already features a multiplicity of major organizations.) Through the pragmatic efforts of the British, the EU's defense dimension should evolve in such a way that it will complement NATO and not complicate NATO's efforts.

The WEU maintains that it currently possesses the capability to perform the Petersberg tasks.¹¹³ The WEU admits, however, that its ability to perform these tasks would be strengthened by improvements in capability. From an American perspective, the WEU/EU collective capability and political cohesion are insufficient to perform sustainable operations, as illustrated by NATO's continued presence in the Balkans. British efforts are more pragmatic, focusing on military capabilities that reinforce institutions and not on empty promises of security structures that exist only in office buildings. The EU does not possess the type of capability envisioned by Britain and the

¹¹³ WEU Council of Ministers, *Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Management Operations. Recommendations for Strengthening European Capabilities for Crisis Management Operations*, Luxembourg, 23 November 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.weu.int>, (15 Mar 2000).

United States. Thus, NATO will continue to be the bedrock of European security for its member nations both in the role of collective defense and in non-Article 5 tasks.

The European Union must learn from the example established by the United States as it works to strengthen its collective military capability. The comparative advantage held by the United States in intelligence and information technologies is one of the factors that has kept America in the leading role in European and global security affairs. According to Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens,

Knowledge, more than ever before, is power. The one country that can best lead the information revolution will be more powerful than the other. For the foreseeable future, that is the United States. America has an apparent strength in military power and economic production. Yet its more subtle comparative advantage is its ability to collect, process, act upon, and disseminate information, an edge that will almost certainly grow over the next decade. This advantage stems from Cold War investments and America's open society, thanks to which it dominates important communications and information processing technologies—space-based surveillance, direct broadcasting, high-speed computers—and has an unparalleled ability to integrate complex information systems...In truth, the 21st century, not the twentieth, will turn out to be the period of America's greatest preeminence. Information is the coin of the international realm, and the United States is better positioned than any other country to multiply the potency of its hard and soft power resources through information.¹¹⁴

Defense Downsizing, 1988-1997 (in percent)

Category	United States	European
Defense Spending*	30	20
Active Military Manpower	34	20
Division-Equivalents**	40	36
Combat Aircraft**	43	20
Naval Combatants**	40	15

*Constant 1997\$. **Active and reserve forces.

Table 2. Defense Downsizing.

¹¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75 (March/April 1996), pp. 20, 35.

NATO Europe and the EU need to follow the lead of the United States. America has experienced similar if not greater cuts in defense budgets and manning since 1988, and has filled the gap with high-technology equipment and professionalized forces. Table 2 illustrates the military drawdowns experienced by the United States and its European Allies in relative terms.¹¹⁵ Although the United States has experienced a greater proportional drawdown in capabilities than has NATO Europe, it has improved its capabilities in some ways during this period to respond to new global security challenges. NATO Europe does not have to reach parity with the United States in terms of force size or technology. It is imperative, however, that NATO Europe develop forces and capabilities that are complementary to those of the United States.

B. STRENGTHENING EUROPE

NATO's intervention in the Kosovo conflict in March-June 1999 was a catalyst for forging a new transatlantic relationship and forming of an autonomous European Union defense posture. The dependence of the Europeans on U.S. military capabilities in Operation Allied Force was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. The ensuing dialogue within the EU has provided the groundwork for a more credible European Union military capability to augment the EU's CFSP. The EU nations participating in the CFSP will have to reform their militaries along the lines pursued by Britain and France.

¹¹⁵ Richard Kugler and Tony Vanderbeek, "Where is NATO's Defense Posture Headed?" *The Strategic Forum*, Number 133, February 1998, The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Available[Online]: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum133.html>.

François Heisbourg, President of the Center for Security Policy in Geneva, has proposed some remedies that must be pursued in the short term to make the EU defense dimension more viable. First, the abolition of conscription and the adoption of all-volunteer professional armed forces are necessary. This would have political and economic costs but would create a more capable force. In Heisbourg's view, conscription forces are a hindrance to the European Union's pursuit of a more effective military posture.

However, the single most important cause of the massive discrepancy between US and European capabilities flows from European force structure policies, and the associated spending priorities. Indeed, the Europeans reign supreme in one area, that of unusable and ultimately unaffordable manpower.¹¹⁶

Second, Heisbourg has argued, the European Union countries must acquire much-needed capabilities. Specifically, satellite surveillance, military electronics, and heavy lift aircraft capabilities are needed. In Heisbourg's view, additional changes would help the EU in the acquisition of capabilities.

In addition to such national initiatives, there are at least three areas in which collective European wide decision-making can make a difference.

- 1) *convergence:*
The expression "convergence criteria" is one which Europeans recognize as the method used to establish the Euro....
- 2) *actions communes:*
In EU parlance, this designates collective initiatives conducted by the EU in specific areas. In the military realm, this could involve, for example, the pooling of all or parts of EU members' airlift capability (along lines already in practise between the French Armée de l'Air and the German Luftwaffe). This is an area where

¹¹⁶ Francois Heisbourg, "Emerging European Power Projection Capabilities" from Joint RAND & GCSP Workshop "NATO's New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East" Geneva, 15-16 July 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.gcsp.ch>.

NATO is not involved, and which can be made compatible with the non-allied status of several EU members....

3) defence industrial base:

There are several initiatives which can be taken at the EU (or at a collective European) level:

- The so-called LOI (Letter of Intent) process whereby the Defence Ministries of Europe's largest arms - producing countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden) attempt to harmonise issues (including security rules and clearances) which make it difficult to merge defence industries on a cross-border basis and conduct cooperative programmes. This could eventually become an EU-scale agreement. This is an essential area, given the growth of cross-border joint companies.¹¹⁷

The idea that Europe need not spend more, but should spend more wisely by pooling efforts, is often dismissed as worthless rhetoric. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen took a more nuanced position in a speech in Munich in February 2000:

I'll tell you what my fear is. My fear is that we will see European nations constructing a new bureaucracy that will be needed to implement some of these reforms in procurement opportunities. In looking at the budgets that I see from our side of the Atlantic, I see countries consistently cutting their budgets at the very same time that there is a recognition that you have to improve your capabilities. Now, some of that can be achieved through efficiencies; some of that can be achieved through better allocation of resources from operation and maintenance to procurement; some of that can be done by downsizing. Some of it can be done by base closures and let me tell you, there is no easy road to base closures.

Some of that can be done, but you cannot continue to cut budgets and hope to achieve the reforms and the procurement requirements for ESDI and for NATO, and my fear is that we will see a bureaucratic system set up. We will see declining budgets and we will not see the capability to match the words that we have talked about so passionately in Washington and now here today as well. That is my concern about ESDI.

¹¹⁷ François Heisbourg, "Emerging European Power Projection Capabilities" from Joint RAND & GCSP Workshop "NATO's New Strategic Concept and Peripheral Contingencies: The Middle East" Geneva, 15-16 July 1999, Available[Online]: <http://www.gcsp.ch>.

I think the EU headline goal of having a rapid-reaction force of fifty to sixty thousand is very commendable and it is achievable, but you have to set some milestones of 2001 and 2002. I haven't seen them yet. So the question is where are the resources to match the rhetoric?¹¹⁸

The United States currently commits 3 percent of its GDP to defense. The current NATO Europe average for defense spending is around 2.6 percent of GDP as illustrated by Figure 1.¹¹⁹




Figure 1. Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP NATO and New member Countries (1998)

Greece and Turkey represent an anomaly in NATO European defense spending trends. Without Greece and Turkey, NATO European defense spending averages about

¹¹⁸ William S. Cohen, 36th Munich Conference on Security Policy –Remarks as Delivered, 5 February 2000, Available[Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2000>, (4 April 2000).

¹¹⁹ "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense," (March 1999), Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil>, Chap. III.

two percent as a percentage of GDP. The 1999 Kosovo crisis provided important lessons learned. These lessons were manifest in the DCI, which provided guidelines for the NATO Allies to follow to attain forces better equipped to meet evolving security challenges. The report to the Congress on NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative states a rather critical view of Allied efforts to date:

The success of [the] DCI depends upon the provision of sufficient resources. Allies need to show leadership in making the necessary investments to field a 21st century force. Defense budgets will always be a function of national priorities, but they must also be a function of both international challenges and the capabilities needed to address those challenges as an Alliance. Yet unresponsive defense budgets continue to erode Alliance capabilities. While Allies acknowledge their capability shortfalls, few have made concrete efforts towards their amelioration by increasing their defense budgets and reallocating funds. In fact, defense spending has been cut by several key Allies. To provide the necessary resources to support DCI, nations must re-evaluate the percentage of their GDP devoted to defense spending and will need to consider restructuring existing forces, reallocating within existing defense budgets, and increasing defense spending.¹²⁰

The ESDI is a concept that promises to strengthen both NATO and the European Union. The true test of the EU's resolve to pursue this concept will be in its willingness to obtain the capabilities and to place national interests aside in order to create effective modalities for the EU's defense dimension. Many hurdles will need to be overcome before the capability and structures are in place to conduct large-scale autonomous operations. It may take 5 to 20 years before the European Union is capable of conducting large-scale autonomous operations. The final form of the EU's autonomous defense mechanism can only be speculated on at this time. However, the process has begun and is moving ahead with the cooperation of the entire European Union and the support of

¹²⁰ Department of Defense, *Report to the Congress on NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative*, March 2000, p. 6.

NATO. The continued engagement of the United States in Europe is critical to the present European security environment, particularly in the Balkans and in light of continuing political and economic uncertainty in Russia.

C. BRITAIN'S CONTINUING ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE

Recent events in the EU have shown that the European Union is willing to take on a greater share of responsibility for its own security. The fear of some Americans has been that such an organization would produce needless duplication, distrust, and decoupling between the European Union and the United States. Britain has, however, continually reassured the United States that the ESDI will be developed within the context of NATO and that a strengthened European Union defense will serve to strengthen the Alliance.

Under Tony Blair's leadership, Britain has become more closely integrated in certain EU endeavors, particularly the quest for a defense dimension. Concurrently, Blair has reassured the United States about the primacy of NATO and the continued need for American engagement in Europe. The maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance is in Britain's interest and an overwhelming imperative. At the same time, the EU's CFSP is quickly becoming a coherent policy, and its military dimension is crucial. Blair's decision to champion defense has enabled Britain to play a key role in shaping the future of the EU and its military structure.

The movement by Britain to champion the emerging EU defense dimension has accomplished the Blair government's political goal of keeping Britain engaged in the European Union and in a leadership position. Britain's strategy to bring the defense debate to the forefront of European Union affairs has managed to overshadow virtually

all other topics of discussion, including Britain's abstention from the euro. Additionally, it has raised Britain's credibility among its European Union partners and has improved Blair's profile as a leader in European Union affairs. With the rising credibility of the European Union, Britain cannot afford to lose out on shaping its future as it did in the 1950s and 1960s with the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community.

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